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Technology Spillover and Productivity Growth under R &D Consorti a 
Policy 
ABSTRACT 
This present  research  studies  the  effect of  the R&D consortia  policy  on the 
productivity growth and technology spillover through FDI in the Southeast Asia region 
using a system dynamics approach Thailand, Malaysia,  and Vietnam are selected as the 
representative countries in the Southeast Asia region. The  R&D consortia policy has not 
been implemented  in these three  countries.  However,  the  effect  of  the R&D  consortia 
policy on  the  selected countries is examined  through the Japanese case which 
successfully utilizes the R&D consortia policy. The study shows that Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam gain benefits from the R&D consortia policy by having higher productivity. 
Increase in the  country's productivity also improves  the average income of the 
population in  that country. By  having more income  per person, the  country  can attract 
more FDI which  in turn increases the  technology spillover  and productivity of  the 
country. Through  sensitivity analysis, the  country  can gain more benefits  by shortening 
the policy implementation duration.  However,  these  benefits  are the short-term benefits 
instead of  the long-term benefits.  The  negative  reaction  of foreign firms toward  the 
implementation of  the R&D consortia  policy  also  shows insignificant effect  on  the 
productivity of the country and the GDP  per capita although it lowers the level of FDI. 
The effect of the R&D consortia  policy on the improvement  of the productivity growth, 
country's economy, and  foreign investment varies due to the economic situation and the 
risk of the country. The  country with mature economy gains more productivity growth but 
acquires less additional  FDI from the policy while the country  with a  rapidly growing 
economy receives less benefit in terms of country productivity but acquires more benefits 
in terms of  FDI. The country  which  is perceived by foreign investors as  a high risk 
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country requires  a  longer  period until the effect of  the R&D  consortia policy on the 
increase in FDI takes place. 
Pard Teekasap 
April 2010 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI ) is one of the key factors that drive the economy 
of th e FD I recipien t countries . Foreig n enterprise s provid e mor e job s wit h highe r 
compensation to loca l workers (Bandick, 2004; Conyon, Girma , Thompson , & Wright , 
2002; F u &  Balasubramanyam , 2005 ; Girm a &  Gorg , 2007 ; Heyman , Sjoholm , & 
Tingvall, 2007 ; Lipse y &  Sjoholm , 2004; Martins , 2004; McDonald , Tuselmann , & 
Heise, 2002; Williams, 1999) and also transfer technology and operational practices from 
the multinationa l firms'  headquarter s t o thei r loca l subsidiarie s whic h increas e th e 
country's productio n outpu t (Baranson , 1970 ; Contracto r &  Sagafi-Nejad , 1981) . 
Moreover, the presence of foreign firms in the industr y also makes the productivit y o f 
domestic firms  i n th e relate d industrie s increas e eve n thoug h the y hav e n o direc t 
interaction with the foreign firms, which also improves the welfare of the host countries 
(Sawada, 2005). This phenomenon is called "technology spillover". 
Technology spillove r i s perceive d a s a  metho d t o reduc e th e productivit y 
capability gap between developing countries and developed countries. Therefore, a lot of 
research has been thoroughly conducted on technology spillovers through FDI including 
the existence of technology spillover (for example, see Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999), 
Chuang and Lin (1999), Li u (2002), an d Cheung and Lin (2004)), the determinan t o f 
technology spillover through FDI (Blomstrom & Sjoholm, 1999; Chuang & Lin, 1999 ; 
Kohpaiboon, 2006 ; Sawada , 2005 ; Sermcheep , 2006 ; Wang , 1997) , an d th e effec t o f 
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public policy on technology spillover (Bozeman, 2000; Derwisch, Kopainsky, & Henson-
Apollonio, 2009 ; Sawada , 2005; Stonema n &  Diederen, 1994) . However, most o f the 
research approaches th e problem based on a static perspective which treats the problems 
as a snapshot picture instead of a change during a period of time. Moreover, they assume 
that the leve l o f technology spillove r has n o effec t o n the leve l o f FD I whic h i s no t 
realistic. Besides, the delay of the effect between each factor and the technology spillover 
are als o neglected . Thes e ar e th e majo r flaw s tha t thi s dissertatio n aim s t o solve . 
Therefore, thi s dissertatio n wil l stud y th e dynamic s o f productivit y growt h fro m 
technology spillover through FDI . Fo r parsimony, the study wil l focu s on the Southeas t 
Asia region and Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam will be used as the case studies. 
Although technology transfer and technology spillover provide benefits to the FD I 
recipient countries, this rarely happens without the assistance from public sectors through 
public policy . Publi c polic y ha s bee n considere d a n importan t facto r t o facilitat e th e 
technology transfe r an d technolog y spillove r because the technolog y marke t i s no t a 
perfect competitio n market (Bozeman, 2000; Stoneman & Diederen, 1994). As a result, 
many policies have been studied in terms of their ability to assist the technology transfer. 
One of such policies is the intellectual property rights which many scholars present as a 
type of policy that prevents, instead of encouraging, the technology spillover (Derwisch, 
et al., 2009; Sawada, 2005). The R&D consorti a policy is, on the other hand, a policy that 
has bee n examine d and proved that i t stimulate s th e technolog y transfer an d spillover 
(Evan & Oik, 1990 ; Lin, Fang, Fang, & Tsai, 2009; Ouchi & Bolton, 1988). 
The R& D consortium i s a n inter-organizatio n cooperatio n t o conduc t R&D 
together. This policy can stimulate technology and knowledge transfer betwee n firms in 
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the consortium and with the research institute s that participate wit h the consortium. The 
success stor y of the R& D consorti a policy starts in the semiconducto r industr y of Japan 
in 1961 which makes Japan one of the global leaders (Ouchi & Bolton, 1988; Sakakibara, 
1997; Watanabe, Kishioka , & Nagamatsu, 2004) . In the U.S. , the R& D consorti a policy 
was implemented after th e U.S . semiconductor industry lost its competitiveness to Japan 
(Aldrich &  Sasaki , 1995 ; Evan &  Oik , 1990). Beside s Japa n an d th e U.S. , th e R&D 
consortia policy has also been implemented in Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan (Lin, et 
al , 2009; Mathews, 2002; Mothe & Quelin, 2000; Sakakibara & Cho, 2002) 
Even though the implementatio n o f the R& D consorti a policy has bee n done in 
many countries , there is no research showin g the us e o f this polic y i n countries i n the 
Southeast Asia region, which have the problem of limited technology capacity (NSTDA, 
2007). Therefore, this research is worth studying because it focuses on the effect o f using 
the R& D consorti a policy on technology spillove r in developing countries i n Southeast 
Asia, focusing on Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. 
Objective 
Based on the above mentioned issues, there is a room for further examinatio n of 
the dynamic s o f productivit y growt h fro m technolog y spillove r throug h FD I when 
considering the feedbac k effec t fro m the productivity level to the leve l of FDI and also 
the effec t o f the R& D consorti a policy on the technology spillover and improvement in 
the productivity of developing countries. Therefore, this dissertation aims to: 
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Objective 1: Examine the productivity growth from technology spillover whether there is 
a feedback effec t from the level of improvement in productivity and technology spillover 
to the FDI leve l 
Even though Sawada (2005) claims that multinational firms have higher costs i f 
the degree of technology spillover is high due to the investment to prevent the technology 
leakage which will affect the investment decision in the future an d Derwisch, Kopainsky 
et al. (2009) study the effec t o f Intellectual Property Rights on the technology spillover 
from FD I i n the agricultural sector with the feedback effec t fro m technology spillover to 
the leve l o f FDI , ther e i s no stron g evidenc e showin g that the feedbac k effec t fro m 
productivity improvement and technology spillover to the leve l of FDI exist . Therefore, 
this researc h wil l stud y whethe r ther e i s a  feedbac k effec t fro m th e productivit y 
improvement and technology spillover to the leve l of FDI b y considering the causality 
between these two variables and also comparing the simulation results when the feedback 
effect is incorporated with the actual data. 
Objective 2 : Stud y th e dynamic s o f productivit y growth from  technolog y spillover 
through FDI i n a short-term and long-term period when incorporating the feedback effec t 
from the productivity improvement and the level of technology spillover to the FD I 
The existing research on the dynamics of technology spillover from FDI i s limited 
and does not incorporate the feedback effec t from the technology spillover to the FDI into 
an equation (fo r example , se e Hu r and Watanab e (2002)) . Moreover , the productivity 
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growth from technology spillover through FDI need s to be considered in both a short run 
and long run in order to understand the overall effect because the benefits i n the short run 
can become th e proble m i n the lon g run (Sami i & Teekasap, 2009) . Therefore , i f the 
study's firs t objectiv e show s a  positiv e result , w e wil l the n stud y th e dynamic s o f 
productivity growt h fro m technolog y spillove r through FD I considering th e feedbac k 
effect from the improvement of productivity to the FDI i n a short-term and a long-term. 
Objective 3: Examine the effect o f the R&D consorti a policy on the productivity growth 
from technology spillover through FDI i n Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
The R& D consorti a policy i s a  successful policy  that has bee n implemente d in 
developed countries suc h as the United States and Europe and works as a key policy in 
transforming developin g countrie s int o develope d countrie s a s happene d i n Japan , 
Taiwan, and Sout h Korea (Aldrich &  Sasaki , 1995; Mathews, 2002; Mothe & Quelin, 
2000; Sakakibara & Cho, 2002). However, there is no evidence o f using this policy to 
encourage th e technology spillover in countries in Southeast Asia. Moreover, there is no 
study o n th e dynamic s o f implementin g a n R& D consortia policy . Therefore , thi s 
dissertation wil l bring to light the dynamics of the effect o f the R& D consorti a policy on 
the productivit y growth from technology spillove r through FD I in Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam. 
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Contribution o f this research 
Most o f the existin g literature o n productivity growth and technology spillovers 
through FD I has mainl y considered th e effec t o f FDI o n the technolog y spillove r (for 
example see Wang (1997) and Sermcheep (2006)) . These studies treat the level of FD I a s 
an exogenous facto r that is not affected b y the degree of technology spillover . However, 
Sawada (2005 ) present s that the multinationa l firms inves t t o preven t th e technolog y 
spillover. Based on this reasoning , hig h level o f technology spillove r will increas e th e 
operating cos t o f th e firm s whic h the n discourag e th e inflo w o f FDI . Therefore , 
considering FD I as a n exogenou s variabl e whic h i s no t affecte d b y th e technolog y 
spillover make these studies oversimplified and does not illustrate the real situation. This 
study wil l tackl e this problem by examining the dynamic s of productivity growth from 
technology spillove r through FD I under th e closed-loo p feedback relationshi p betwee n 
FDI an d the productivity improvement. 
How publi c policy affect s th e leve l o f technology spillove r from FD I has als o 
been studied for many years. One of the policies that had been successfully implemented 
is the R&D consorti a policy. The R&D consorti a policy has been adopted and effectively 
enhanced th e technolog y transfe r i n Japan, Unite d States, Taiwan, Korea, an d Europe 
(Aldrich &  Sasaki , 1995 ; Mathews , 2002; Moth e & Quelin , 2000 ; Sakakibara , 1997 ; 
Sakakibara & Cho, 2002) . However, there is neither a study on the implementation of the 
R&D consorti a policy in developing countries in Southeast Asia nor about the dynamics 
of productivity growth from technology spillover through FD I unde r the R& D consorti a 
policy. For that reason, this research wil l study the dynamics of productivity growth from 
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technology spillover through FDI under the R&D consortia policy in Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam. 
In summary , thi s researc h i s differen t fro m th e existin g research becaus e thi s 
research wil l stud y th e dynamics , instea d o f the statics , o f productivity growt h fro m 
technology spillover through FDI when incorporating the feedback effec t unde r the R&D 
consortia policy . Suc h polic y i f successfull y implemente d ca n transfor m developin g 
countries int o develope d countrie s i n the Eas t Asi a regio n bu t ther e i s n o academi c 
evidence of such implementation in developing countries in Southeast Asia especially in 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Productivity can be improved from the technology spillover through the presence 
of foreign firms. However, even though there is no foreign investment, the performanc e 
of local firms still varies from firm-to-firm base d on other factors. Therefore, we need to 
understand those factors that affect the productivity of the firms in order to eliminate their 
influence t o th e chang e i n productivit y when studyin g th e pur e effec t o f FD I on 
productivity growth from technology spillover. 
Determinants of productivity 
Productivity is affected by many factors. Based on the existing literature, we can 
summarize the factor s int o three levels of analysis, which ar e countr y level , industry 
level, and firm level. 
Country level 
When we consider the productivit y at the countr y level , i t i s measured b y the 
gross domestic product (GDP) or aggregate demand per employment which presents the 
monetary value of the outcome that each employment can produce on average. There are 
two main methods to calculate a country's productivity: the aggregat e demand method 
and the production function. 
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The aggregate demand calculation is one of the early developments i n economics 
by Joh n Maynar d Keynes in his famou s boo k "Th e Genera l Theor y o f Employment, 
Interest, an d Money " (Keynes , 1936) . Th e aggregat e deman d i s derive d fro m th e 
summation o f consumption , investment , governmen t spending , an d ne t export . Eve n 
though this equation is widely accepted, i t is mainly used to explain the conceptual idea 
of which factors affec t the GDP instead of a framework for an empirical research because 
of th e difficultie s i n gathering th e data . Moreover , in order t o forecas t th e aggregat e 
demand, many variables require behavioral analysis which is complicated. 
Another approach which is more applicable for empirical work is the production 
function develope d by Cobb and Douglas (1928). Cobb and Douglas presented that the 
production P is affected b y the amoun t o f man-hour o f labor L and fixe d capita l K as 
shown in equation 1 . This equation was tested with U.S. data during 1889 and 1992. The 
results show a small deviation between the equation and the actual data. 
However, technology change or "technical change" als o affect t o the production 
(Solow, 1957) . Beside s th e capita l an d labor , Solo w (1957) adde d th e tim e int o th e 
function to capture "technical change" which includes any kind of shift in the production 
function. Therefore, the equation becomes as shown in equation 2. From that, we can take 
the special form with A(t) as a multiplicative factor as shown in equation 3. 
(1) 
P = F(K,L;t) (2) 
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P = A(t)f(K,L) (3) 
The above model is the standard production function of a neoclassical model. A(t) 
represents the output gain from other factors besides labor and capital which change over 
time such as technology development, innovation, and new management practices . 
Industry Level 
The previou s sectio n focuse s o n the factor s tha t affec t th e productivit y at th e 
macro level . In this section, we concentrate o n the industr y level because the industrial 
characteristics can also affect the productivity of the firms. 
Chuang and Lin (1999) studied the factors that affect the productivity in Taiwan's 
manufacturing industry . Th e productivit y valu e i s measure d fro m th e tota l facto r 
productivity which i s collected from the firms ' total factor productivit y under constan t 
returns to scal e and variable returns to scal e assumption. Chuang and Li n studie d both 
firm-level factor s an d industry-level factors. However , the result s o n firm-level factor s 
are discussed in the next section. 
The industry-level factors tha t are studied in Chuang and Lin's research include 
industry's concentration ratio, which is measured fro m the marke t shar e of four larges t 
firms i n the industry , and the marke t openness , whic h i s the shar e of exports t o total 
industry output. The regression results show that both factors are significant to the change 
in productivity but in an opposite way. Market concentration has a negative effect while 
the market openness has a positive effect on the productivity. 
10 
Kohpaiboon (2006) also studied the determinan t o f productivity by focusing on 
the Thai manufacturing industry. The dependent variable is the labor productivity of local 
firms. Th e independent variable s include the effec t o f foreign presence an d firm-leve l 
characteristics which is discussed in the following section. For the industry-level factors, 
Kohpaiboon studied the effect o f trade policy regime and market concentration which is 
also studied by Chuang and Li n (1999) . The results contradic t Chuang and Li n (1999 ) 
findings tha t the marke t concentratio n significantl y supports th e productivit y due to a 
competition effect. However , the industria l trade policy does not significantly affect th e 
productivity. 
From the researc h discusse d above , we can conclude that competition, through 
market opennes s in Chuang and Li n (1999) an d marke t concentratio n i n Kohpaiboo n 
(2006), improve the productivity of local firms. 
Firm level 
The effects o f firm-level factors on the firm's productivity are likely to be studied 
together with the effect o f the industry-level factors. Therefore, we refer to the studies by 
Chuang and Li n (1999 ) and Kohpaiboon (2006) that we have reviewed in the industry-
level section. 
Chuang and Lin (1999) studie d the effec t o f the labo r quality , firm's size , and 
firm's share of export to total output on the productivity. Labor quality is measured from 
the employment share of white-collar workers, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, and 
the relative wage of white to blue-collar workers. The results show a significant positive 
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effect o f th e productio n scal e o f a  firm , shar e o f exports , an d labo r qualit y o n th e 
productivity of the firms. 
Kohpaiboon (2006) integrated a  part of Chuang and Lin (1999) research with the 
Cobb-Douglas production function by using the firm's capital-labor ratio, capital stock of 
the firm, and the labor quality. Instead o f measuring the labor quality as Chuang and Li n 
(1999) did , Kohpaiboon used the ratio of supervisory and management workers to total 
industry employmen t t o represen t th e labo r quality . Th e result s suppor t Cob b an d 
Douglas (1928)'s finding s but contradict the results of Chuang and Lin (1999) because he 
found a significant positive relationship between the firm's capital-labor ratio and firm's 
capital stoc k wit h the productivit y o f the firm s whil e the relationshi p betwee n labo r 
quality and the productivity is not significant. 
Sermcheep (2006 ) also studied the factors that affect th e productivity of the Thai 
manufacturing industr y by focusing mainly on the presence of foreign firms and the firm -
level factors. The factors include d in her study are the capital per employee, material per 
employee, education level of workers, firm's training program, R&D intensity , firm size, 
export intensity , an d impor t intensity . Th e R& D intensit y i s measured b y the rati o of 
R&D expenditure s t o tota l sales . Th e siz e of the firm s i s measured b y the numbe r of 
employee and the total assets of the firms . The export and import intensity is quantified 
by the ratio of exports to total sales and the ratio of import materials to total materials. 
The results from Sermcheep (2006 ) sho w the significan t contribution of capital 
per employee an d material per employee on the firm' s productivity, which supports the 
finding fro m Cob b an d Dougla s (1928) . Th e educatio n leve l o f workers , trainin g 
programs, an d th e R& D intensity alon e d o no t sho w a  significan t effec t o n th e 
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productivity of the firm but the education level and training combined have a significant 
relationship wit h the productivity . However, the findin g about the effec t o f firm's size 
contradicts Chuan g an d Li n (1999 ) finding s sinc e Sermchee p foun d insignifican t 
relationship betwee n th e fir m siz e an d th e productivity . However , th e relationshi p 
between the export and import intensity with the productivity is also significant. 
In summary, the variables that are significantly related to the productivity of the 
firms and should be controlled when studying the effec t o f foreign direct investment on 
technology spillover are: fixed capital , labor, material, export intensity, import intensity, 
and industry concentration. Ther e are othe r variable s that provide inconclusive findings 
on how they affec t productivit y due t o the contradictor y result s i n different paper s but 
should also be included as control variables when firm-level analysis is conducted. These 
variables are the labor quality and the size of the firm . 
Evidence of productivity growth from technology spillover 
In the previou s section , we describe d ho w the productivit y of the firm s varie s 
based on many factors that are not related to foreign investment. Thus , the next important 
question to be examined is whether there is a technology spillover or not. There are many 
studies showin g th e existenc e o f technolog y spillove r i n differen t environments . I n 
general, the existing research identifie s the relationship between the presence of foreign 
firms and an improvement o f productivity of the local firms as an evidence of technology 
spillover. 
We start with the study by Chuang and Lin (1999). In this study, they focused on 
the productivit y change from the spillover s in Taiwan's manufacturin g industry . Th e 
13 
authors used linea r regression t o find the relationship betwee n the presence of a foreign 
firm, measured from the share of foreign assets at the industry level , and the productivity 
of loca l firm s represente d b y th e loca l firms ' tota l facto r productivity . The y foun d a 
positive relationshi p betwee n th e shar e o f foreig n asset s an d th e firms ' tota l facto r 
productivity which can imply that there is a  technology spillove r in the manufacturin g 
industry in Taiwan. 
In the sam e year, Blomstrom and Sjohol m also publishe d a  paper to sho w th e 
productivity growt h fro m technolog y spillove r i n Indonesi a (Blomstro m &  Sjoholm , 
1999). Instead of using the share of foreign assets at the industry level as Chuang and Lin 
(1999), they used th e foreig n shar e in the foreig n affiliate . Moreover , they also studie d 
the effec t o f foreign presence on productivity of both the foreig n affiliat e an d the loca l 
firms i n the sam e industry b y usin g th e labo r productivity , measure d fro m th e valu e 
added per labo r ratio , a s a  dependent variable. Th e regressio n result s indicate tha t th e 
foreign share has a  positive significant effec t o n the productivity of both foreign affiliat e 
and loca l firm s whic h also show s th e sam e result a s Chuan g an d Li n (1999) tha t th e 
technology spillove r exists. 
Liu (2002 ) revisite d thi s issu e agai n an d expande d th e existin g literatur e b y 
examining th e technolog y spillove r effect withi n the sam e industry an d als o between 
different industries . No t onl y th e relationshi p betwee n FD I and th e productivit y wa s 
studied, h e als o examine d th e relationshi p betwee n FD I an d th e growt h rat e o f 
productivity. Thi s stud y wa s base d o n dat a from  2 9 manufacturin g industrie s i n th e 
Shenzhen Economi c Zone o f Chin a during 199 3 an d 199 8 usin g a  log-lo g regressio n 
model which is developed fro m the productio n functio n b y Cob b and Dougla s (1928) . 
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The results do not show a significant relationship between FD I and productivity and the 
productivity growth for the overal l industry bu t i t shows a  positive relationship in the 
component industries . Moreover , other industrie s als o ge t benefit s fro m th e foreig n 
investment which denotes that the spillover effect i s not limited only to the same industry 
but also affects other industries. 
Cheung and Li n (2004) als o studie d the existenc e o f spillover effect i n China. 
However, they differentiate thei r research by focusing on the effect o f FDI on innovation 
measured by the number of patent applications instead of the productivity or value-added 
and using the provincia l data instead o f industrial data. They used a  pooled time-series 
cross-sectional regression to include data from all provinces during 1995 and 2000. The 
results indicat e tha t th e FD I spillove r effec t o n loca l innovatio n i s positiv e an d 
significant. 
In summary , th e productivit y growt h fro m technolog y spillove r through FDI 
exists whic h i s prove d b y th e positiv e relationshi p betwee n th e degre e o f foreig n 
investment an d the productivity , productivity growth, and innovation of local firms . In 
addition, not only the local firms within the same industry receive the spillover effect, but 
also the local firms in other industries gain benefits from FDI. 
Determinants of technology spillover through FDI 
Even though it has been shown in the previous section that there is a significant 
effect o f FDI on improving the productivity of domestic firms, the degree of spillover in 
each environment i s different. I n general, the factor s tha t affect th e degree of spillover 
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can be groupe d int o fou r categorie s whic h ar e characteristi c o f the recipien t country , 
industry, domestic firms, and foreign firms. 
Recipient country characteristics 
The attribut e o f th e recipien t countr y affect s th e decisio n making o f foreign 
investment (Dunning , 1998) an d als o the degre e of technology spillove r from foreign 
investment to local firms as indicated in the study of Wang (1997) and Meyer and Sinani 
(2009). 
Wang (1997)' s stud y focuse s o n th e internationa l technolog y transfe r an d 
spillover from U.S. multinationals during 1980s . The degree of technology transfe r i s 
measured by the amount of royalties and license fee payments to the U.S . The attribute s 
that he focuse d o n are trade openness which i s measured fro m the differenc e i n U.S . 
exports t o th e recipien t countr y an d the U.S . exports t o U.S . foreig n affiliates i n that 
country and the quality of human capital which is quantified by the number o f years of 
education. Wang found that both trade openness and the quality of human capital have a 
significant positive influence on the degree of technology spillover. 
Another pape r tha t concentrates o n the countr y characteristic s an d the leve l of 
spillover i s Meye r an d Sinan i (2009) . Thi s paper use d a  meta-regression metho d an d 
utilized th e dat a fro m publishe d an d unpublishe d existin g literatur e o n technolog y 
spillover. They focused o n the effec t o f host country' s leve l o f development, whic h is 
divided int o th e leve l o f pe r capit a income , leve l o f huma n capital , an d leve l o f 
institutional development , an d the effec t o f trade openness on the technology spillover. 
The GDP per capit a is used fo r the pe r capit a income. The leve l o f human capita l is 
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indicated b y th e gros s enrollmen t rati o i n tertiary education , R& D expenditure a s a 
percentage o f GDP , an d th e rati o o f the numbe r o f patents grante d t o hos t countr y 
residents pe r GDP . Fo r the leve l o f institutional development , th e Economi c Freedo m 
Index fro m th e Heritag e Foundatio n an d th e Corruptio n Perceptio n Inde x b y 
Transparency Internationa l ar e used . Th e trade opennes s i s measure d b y th e su m of 
exports and imports divided by the GDP. 
The results sho w that the leve l o f development o f host countries , which i s the 
composite of per capit a income, human capital , and institutional development, an d the 
degree of technology spillover has a  curvilinear with U-shaped pattern whil e the trade 
openness has a positive linear relationship with the technology spillover. 
The rational behinds the curvilinear relationship can be explained based on Chen 
(1996)'s awareness-motivation-capabilit y framework . Fo r low-incom e countries , th e 
foreign investmen t aim s to acces s t o lo w labor cos t resources an d mainly for export -
oriented purposes. Therefore , there is no direc t competition between foreig n firms and 
domestic firms. Domestic firms also are not aware of the competition with foreign firms 
because of the low similarity between the characteristics of domestic and foreign firms. 
However, domesti c firm s ca n lear n non-proprietar y knowledg e fro m demonstratio n 
effects because the technology gap between foreign firms and domestic firms is high. For 
the case of middle-income countries, a foreign firm invest s to access both a new market 
and for labor opportunities. Thus, foreign firms and domestic firms are likely to have a 
direct competition. Although the domestic firms are aware of the threat, they don't have 
the capabilit y to protect thei r territory. The demonstration effec t i s unlikely to provide 
substantial benefits because domestic firms already know the non-proprietary knowledge 
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and foreign firms do not share their proprietary technology. Therefore, the productivity of 
domestic firm s i s low. In high-income economies, loca l firms and foreign firms have a 
strong head-to-head competition. In high-income countries, as opposed to middle-income 
economies, domestic firms have the capability and experience in dealing with aggressive 
competition. At the end of the struggle , weak firms wil l leav e the industr y and only the 
strong firms survive. Therefore, the average productivity of domestic firms increases. 
The market opennes s stimulates th e developmen t o f productivity of local firm s 
because i t create s a  highe r competitiv e marke t environmen t an d als o provide s a n 
opportunity fo r domesti c firm s t o lear n ne w knowledg e an d technolog y fro m foreig n 
investment. 
In summary, per capita income, quality of human capital , and trade openness of 
the FDI recipient countries affect the level of technology spillover. 
Industry characteristics 
Sermcheep (2006 ) considered the type of industry whether i t is a low-, medium-, 
or high-technolog y industr y an d th e productivit y growt h fro m technolog y spillove r 
through FDI. The results indicate that firms in the low- and medium-technology level can 
gain higher benefits fro m the presence of foreign enterprises than the local firms in high-
technology industrie s becaus e o f the differenc e betwee n th e technologica l capability 
between domesti c firms and foreign firms in the low- and medium-technology industrie s 
is smal l enoug h fo r th e loca l firm s t o absorb . However , th e technolog y i n high-
technology industries is mainly a proprietary knowledge and the absorptive capability of 
the domestic firms is not enough to acquire all the technology from foreign firms. 
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Kohpaiboon (2006) also studied the effec t o f each industry-level variable on the 
technology spillover by using a two-step leas t square regression. The first regression is to 
find th e relationshi p betwee n eac h variabl e an d th e foreig n investment . Th e secon d 
regression i s th e relationshi p betwee n foreig n investmen t an d th e productivit y o f 
domestic firms . Th e resul t o f the secon d equatio n show s tha t the presenc e o f foreign 
firms significantly reduces the productivity of local firms, which contradicts the findings 
of many researchers who have been referenced above . The factors that are considered in 
the firs t equatio n ar e labo r productivity , market size , trade policy , an d labo r quality . 
Interestingly, the results indicated that labor productivity, market size of the industry, and 
trade policy have a  significan t negative relationshi p with  the foreig n investmen t while 
labor quality significantly supports the foreign investment. Therefore , base d o n the two 
regressions, an industry with high labor productivity, large market size, and a high rate of 
protection is likely to have higher technology spillover while the labor quality will reduce 
the technology spillover. 
Domestic firm characteristics 
One of the firm's attributes that affects th e technology spillover is the technology 
gap between domesti c firm s an d foreign firms. Sawada (2005) develope d a  theoretical 
model based on the game theory approach that domestic firms will inves t to increase the 
technology spillovers while foreign firms also have an incentive to invest to prevent th e 
technology spillover. From his model, an increase in the technology gap will increase the 
technology spillover due to the demonstration effect . However , when the technology gap 
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increases ove r th e critica l level , th e technolog y spillove r wil l decreas e becaus e th e 
benefits of a technology spillover are less than the cost to acquire the technology. 
Sermcheep (2006) considered the effect of firm size and the market orientation on 
the productivit y growth fro m technolog y spillover . Smal l firm s ar e likel y t o hav e a 
positive productivity growth while the spillove r level i s reduced an d becomes negativ e 
for the large firms due to the direct competition effect. Large firms tend to compete in the 
same market a s foreign firms. Therefore, whe n foreign firms inves t in Thailand, large 
domestic firm s los e thei r marke t shar e t o th e foreig n firms . However , small - an d 
medium-size domesti c firm s gai n benefit s fro m th e technolog y spillove r without th e 
competition effec t du e to a  different targe t market. Moreover , domestic firm s that are 
export oriente d ar e likel y t o gai n less benefi t fro m th e technolog y spillove r than th e 
domestic firms that focus on the domestic market because export-oriented domestic firms 
can access the technology from interacting with international markets an d international 
competitors whereas the domestic-oriented local firms cannot. 
Foreign firm characteristics 
Instead o f looking a t the characteristic s o f domestic firms , Buckley, Clegg , and 
Wang (2007) focused on the relationship between the nationality of ownership of foreign 
firms and the technology spillover. They studied the case of foreign investment in China 
by overseas Chinese firms, including firms from Hong Kong, Macau , and Taiwan, by 
comparing the m with  th e investmen t fro m firm s from Western countries . Th e result s 
show tha t th e relationshi p betwee n th e presenc e o f oversea s Chines e firm s an d th e 
productivity of domestic firms in low-technology industries is curvilinear with an inverse 
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U-shaped pattern while the relationship between the presence of overseas Chinese firms 
and th e productivit y i n high-tec h industrie s an d th e presenc e o f Wester n firm s an d 
productivity o f domestic s firm s i n al l industries i s positiv e an d linear . A  curvilinear 
relationship occurred because the overseas Chinese firms and domestic firms are likely to 
have a direct competition which creates a market stealing and crowding-out effect. I n the 
case o f high-technology industries , oversea s Chines e firm s nee d t o compet e wit h the 
firms from Western countries. Therefore , th e overseas Chinese firms and Western firms 
are considerably equal. In the case of an investment from Western firms, the investmen t 
is mainly focused on a different marke t segment . Therefore, domesti c firms can gain the 
benefits fro m technology spillover without a negative effect from the competition. 
FDI, technology spillover and the host country welfare 
The effect o f FDI and technology spillover on the welfare o f the host country is 
ambiguous. O n one hand , consumer s gai n benefit s fro m th e FD I and th e technolog y 
spillover becaus e of lower price an d increase d productivity . On the othe r hand , loca l 
firms may suffer from the competition with the foreign firms as shown in Figure 1. 
Based o n the Courno t Nash Equilibrium model , Sawada (2005 ) suggeste d tha t 
whether th e hos t country' s welfar e i s better o r wors e shoul d be considere d fro m th e 
marginal cos t o f loca l firm s an d foreig n firm s befor e an d afte r th e FD I an d th e 
technology gap . I f the margina l cos t o f foreig n firm s befor e FD I is lowe r tha n th e 
marginal cost of local companies, FDI always supports host country's welfare. Moreover, 
if the difference betwee n the marginal costs of the foreign firms before an d after the FDI 
is less than double of the technology gap, the host country stil l benefits. However , if the 
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difference is more than double of the technology gap, the spillover becomes negative and 
the change in host country's welfare becomes ambiguous. 
Figure 1: Effect of FDI on host country's welfare 
Public policy and technology spillover 
Acquiring advanced technology is always desired by domestic firms in order to 
improve their competitive position in the market. However, technology does not have the 
same behavior a s a  public good in the sens e that everyone benefit s from  acquirin g it 
(Contractor &  Sagafi-Nejad , 1981) . Eve n thoug h technolog y spillove r provide s 
significant benefit s fo r loca l firms , i t come s a t th e expens e o f losin g competitiv e 
advantage for foreign firms (Sawada, 2005). Therefore, in order to stimulate technology 
spillover, especially in developing countries, the government s nee d to com e up with a 
public policy  tha t increase s th e absorptiv e capabilit y o f loca l firm s an d provide s 
incentives for foreign firms to ease their technology spillover barrier (Bozeman, 2000). 
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In addition, Stoneman and Diederen (1994) also suggested tha t a public policy is 
required because the technolog y marke t i s imperfect . I f the technolog y marke t wer e a 
perfect market , technolog y shoul d be developed, traded, transferred , an d spille d until it 
reaches equilibriu m whereas th e margina l benefit s fro m adoptin g th e technolog y ar e 
equal t o th e margina l socia l cos t o f producin g th e capita l good s tha t embod y tha t 
technology. Th e technology marke t i s imperfec t becaus e of the imperfec t information , 
market power, and externalities. 
Information o n the benefit s o f new o r advanced technolog y i s unknown to th e 
technology adopter s until they alread y adop t it. The technology provider s also have an 
incentive to provide only information they prefe r other s to know. The limitation in the 
number o f suppliers an d customers als o creates a market failure . When the numbe r of 
customers i s small, sales of one technology supplier are the lost sales of other suppliers . 
Therefore, technology providers will push to sell their technology faster tha n the optimal 
point. Another factor is the externalities. When the benefit o f adopting one technology is 
dependent on the number of users of that technology, the system can be locked-in into an 
inferior technology (Arthur , 1994; Sterman, 2000). This situation makes th e technology 
providers drive their customers to adopt the technology before the optimal time. 
Public policy  i s required fo r technology spillover , but no t ever y polic y reaches 
that goal . Contracto r an d Sagafi-Neja d (1981 ) publishe d a  literatur e revie w o n 
government policie s that stimulate technology transfer an d spillover. One type of public 
policy is to enact a law to facilitate and control foreign investment suc h as the Mexican 
Law of 1972. These types of control have a range that goes from bureaucratic decision s 
to published criteria such as a limit on royalties paid. However, these rules, most of the 
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time, cannot achiev e their purpose. Fo r example, foreign firms can create other forms of 
payment in order to attain the same returns on technology. In some cases, the governmen t 
can provide an exception if the technology is strongly required. 
In man y cases , publi c policie s creat e a  counterintuitiv e resul t du e t o man y 
limitations. For example, local content policy aims to encourage foreign firms to establish 
local plant s an d utiliz e loca l resources , whic h provide s benefit s i n lowerin g 
unemployment, increasin g productivity, and lowering the product price. However, due to 
the limitations in the number and quality of potential suppliers, they face the problem of 
poor quality, scheduling delays, and higher costs (Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad, 1981). 
The previou s exampl e illustrate s th e failur e o f a  publi c policy . Therefor e th e 
question becomes what types of policies should be implemented. Stoneman and Diederen 
(1994) recommend public policies that can relieve the market imperfection problem. One 
way i s to provid e a  channel fo r the technolog y recipien t t o gai n essential informatio n 
which can be done through a  public subsidy on technology monitoring and technology 
consulting activities . Another way is to transfe r th e ris k of imperfect informatio n into 
government sector s suc h a s a  governmen t R& D program . Th e thir d method t o solv e 
imperfect informatio n i s t o se t u p standards . However , a s discusse d above , a  rigi d 
standard may not be able to achieve its goal. 
Another public policy on technology spillover that has been studied extensively is 
the intellectual property rights. Intellectual Property Rights is the ability of the inventor s 
to acquir e th e proprietar y right s o f that knowledge . Base d o n gam e theory , Sawad a 
(2005) sugges t that intellectua l property right s preven t th e technolog y spillove r from 
foreign firms to domestic firms because foreign firms have an incentive to invest more on 
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spillover prevention while domestic firms are discouraged by that. Because of reduced 
technology spillover , loca l firm s los e thei r competitivenes s whil e a n investmen t fro m 
foreign firms is likely to increase due to lowered competition. 
Derwisch, Kopainsky , an d Henson-Apolloni o (2009 ) als o stud y th e effec t o f 
intellectual propert y right s o n foreig n investmen t an d technolog y spillove r i n th e 
agriculture industry by using a system dynamics approach. In their paper, the intellectual 
property rights are assumed to have a low or no spillover effect a s suggested by Sawada 
(2005). The results indicate that if the technology gap between the foreign firms and local 
firms i s large , domesti c enterprise s canno t surviv e without th e technolog y spillover . 
However, i f the technolog y ga p i s small , domesti c firm s ca n stil l compet e wit h th e 
foreign firms. 
In summary , intellectua l property right s preven t th e technolog y spillove r fro m 
foreign investmen t an d are likel y to provide benefits fo r foreign firms instead o f local 
firms. There is another public policy that has been used in developing countries such as 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and has resulted in the transformation fro m low-labor 
cost industries to technology-advanced industries and has provided the ability to compete 
face-to-face wit h developed countries. This policy is the R&D consortia policy. 
R&D consortia policy 
The R&D consortia policy is a public policy that stimulates the cooperation of the 
research an d developmen t activitie s of the firm s in the sam e and related industrie s to 
innovate new and advance d technolog y which ca n change the competitivenes s o f the 
firms i n the industries . The firms who join the R& D consorti a can gain economies of 
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scale, share the risks of an innovation, set the standards fo r a new technology, and share 
complementary knowledg e (Evan &  Oik, 1990). The R& D consorti a policy ha s bee n 
used in many countries and regions including the U.S. , Europe, Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. However, in most cases, the knowledge is transferred an d spillovered within the 
domestic firms. How the R&D consortia policy affects the spillover from foreign firms to 
domestic firms has not been studied before. This knowledge gap is what this dissertation 
targets to do. 
The R&D consortia , as defined above, contradicts the la w of competition. Ho w 
can two direct competitors conduct research together and come up with the same product 
offering to the same customers a t the same time? If it happens, we would cal l it a cartel 
instead o f competition. Therefore , onl y som e types o f technology and knowledge are 
appropriate for the R&D consortia . Ouchi and Bolton (1988) divide intellectual property 
into three types: private property, public property, and leaky property. Private property is 
the intellectual property that the private party legally has a  full righ t to appropriate and 
transfer t o others . Publi c propert y i s the knowledg e that inventor s canno t appropriat e 
even fo r a  shor t perio d of time. Leak y propert y i s the knowledg e that inventor s can 
appropriate for a short period of time. 
Even though onl y th e privat e property i s worth conducting R&D, al l types of 
knowledge ar e essential . Ouch i an d Bolto n (1988 ) recommended that the governmen t 
sector, public-funde d universities , an d not-for-profi t researc h organization s shoul d 
produce public property. For leaky property, the incentive for inventors is less than the 
benefit they can get from the knowledge. However, with  the collaboration of the parties 
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who wil l gai n benefits fro m that knowledge such as the R& D consortia , the return fo r 
each party on researching on leaky property is positive. 
Another challeng e i s ho w t o manag e an d hol d th e collaboratio n when ever y 
member has an incentive to defect, a s in the prisoner's dilemma situation. Arend (2005) 
suggests that all parties mus t signa l the truthfu l expectatio n o f the valu e of their joint 
work and provide the penaltie s fo r defectin g i n order t o hav e the R& D collaboration. 
However, most R&D consortia do not have the same characteristics as the suggestion. 
Determinants of knowledge transfer through R&D consortia 
Even though the R&D consortia have been implemented for many years in many 
countries, the stud y o n which factor s creat e successful R& D consorti a is very limited. 
Lin, Fang , Fan g an d Tsa i (2009 ) focu s o n th e effec t o f networ k embeddednes s on 
technology transfe r i n the R& D consorti a in Taiwan. They conducted a  survey abou t 
government-supported R& D consorti a in Taiwan. The results sho w that the technology 
transfer i s better if the consorti a are concentrated an d have strong network ties, mutual 
trust, an d share d norms . The y also foun d tha t technology transfe r betwee n firm s and 
institutions suc h as universitie s i s better than with  othe r firm s because of there is no 
conflict of interest. 
R&D consortia in Japan 
Japan was the first country to implement an R&D consortia policy which resulted 
in th e bi g jump i n its competitive position in the globa l market. Th e most successfu l 
project was the very large scale integrated circuits (VLSI) project. 
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The R& D consortia i n Japa n wer e triggere d b y th e Minin g an d Industria l 
Technological Research Association Law o f 1961, issue d by the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) . This law encourages Japanese firms to set up an association 
to conduc t joint research . Du e to th e collectivis m cultur e i n Japan, MIT I focuse d o n 
encouraging cooperative activities between the firms rather than being concerned about 
the anti-competitive situation (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995) . 
The collaboration under the R&D consorti a had actually started since 1956 under 
the term "Technology Research Association" which was modeled on a British World War 
I program that allowed small and medium sized firms who could not afford to run their 
own R& D t o do collaborative research. However , the key goal for the Britis h Research 
Association was to solve the technical problems instead of conducting R&D. Th e R& D 
consortia in Japan received funding from the government in either a research contract, in 
which the government owned the research and licensed to the association, or a forgivable 
loan, in which the association owned the result and repaid the money to the government i f 
the project was successful. 
One of the earl y associations wa s the VLS I Technolog y Research Association. 
The formatio n o f VLS I technolog y researc h associatio n wa s establishe d fro m th e 
introduction o f th e fourt h generatio n o f th e semiconducto r technology . Th e firs t 
generation was the vacuum tube, the second generation was the transistor, an d the third 
generation was based on the integrated circuit . In 1975, the fourth generation which was 
based on the very large scale integrated circuit s (VLSI) was just introduced . In order to 
advance from third generation into the fourth generation technology, new manufacturing 
processes and equipment s wer e required . The companies ha d two choices : they coul d 
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conduct the researc h individuall y an d come up with  their own standards which would 
require uniqu e equipmen t an d tooling , o r they coul d conduc t the researc h togethe r to 
create this new generic knowledge and set the same standards throughout the industry. It 
was clear that in order to compete with the U.S., the second choice was not just a choice, 
it wa s a  necessity . Thus , fiv e larg e semiconductor-compute r companies , whic h wer e 
NEC, Toshiba , Hitachi, Fujitsu , an d Mitsubishi , an d the Electro-Technica l Laboratory 
(ETL) of MITI joined together into the VLSI Technology Research Association. 
The structur e o f the associatio n was divide d int o two majo r unit s -  th e joint 
laboratory and the grou p laboratories . The joint laboratory consisted of 10 0 scientists; 
five from the ETL and the rest were from the other members. For the group laboratories, 
the associatio n se t u p tw o group s whic h wer e th e CD L grou p (Fujitsu , Hitachi , an d 
Mitsubishi) an d the NTI S grou p (NE C an d Toshiba) . The joint laboratory worked on 
generic and basic R&D project s fo r which the technology would equally benefit t o all 
members. Th e grou p laboratorie s undertoo k th e applicatio n research whic h wa s no t 
appropriate for the joint lab. The later phases of product development and manufacturing 
were conducted exclusively by each company on its own. 
The researc h wa s als o categorize d int o "ad d vectors " project s an d "principa l 
vector" projects. "Add vectors" projects were the projects that each party could add equal 
value and which required the exchang e o f information or smal l joint experiments, but 
required n o majo r capita l expenditure. "Principa l vector " projects, o n the othe r hand , 
required majo r capita l expenditures . "Ad d vector" project s include d tw o o r thre e 
scientists from  eac h membe r whil e "principa l vector " project s include d eight t o te n 
scientists fro m on e company, two or three from on e or two additional companies, and 
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none from the remaining companies. However, all intellectual property was immediately 
available for licensing to all members . 
The VLSI association was a very successful project which can be measured by the 
achievement o f the goa l o f developing process technolog y fo r 256 K DRA M an d th e 
1,000 gate logic, several industry standards were se t up, 600 patents were awarded and 
1,000 patent applications were filed . Th e benefits fro m the association were not limited 
only to th e associatio n members bu t i t als o spille d ove r the entir e Japanes e industry, 
which made the Japanese semiconductor and electronic appliance industry dominate the 
world market (Ouchi & Bolton, 1988). 
The VLSI Technology Research Association was a very successful story, but it is 
also a rare case. Sakakibara (1997) studied the pattern and the benefits o f R&D consortia 
in Japa n by surveying the R& D manager s of 237 R& D consorti a in Japan. I n general, 
there is no clear linkage between the competitivenes s o f the industry , measured b y the 
export share , an d the number o f R&D consortia . The results fro m the surve y show that 
the goa l o f R& D consorti a ha s shifte d fro m nea r commercializatio n stage t o basi c 
research du e to a shift in the business focu s from overseas competitio n to new business 
venturing. Along with the change in business focus, firms join the R&D consorti a mainly 
to access complementary knowledge instead of sharing the R& D cos t or catching up the 
overseas an d non-participatin g competitors . Moreover , manager s foun d tha t R&D 
consortia encourag e mor e R& D spendin g fo r eac h firm , o n averag e 38 % increase i n 
private R&D spendin g compared to the spending without R&D consortia . However, the 
surveys sho w tha t perceive d benefit s from  R& D consortia ar e intangibl e suc h a s 
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researcher trainin g and increased awareness of R&D instead of tangible benefits suc h as 
valuable knowledge. 
The perceive d intangibl e benefit s ca n b e explaine d b y th e typ e o f research . 
Because th e researc h mainl y focuses o n basi c knowledge , i t i s har d t o translat e thi s 
intellectual property into monetary value. Even if it could be justified, i t would be a very 
small amount compare d to the near commercialization research. Nevertheless, the R& D 
consortia policy is still widely used in many industries in Japan. 
R&D consortia in the U.S. 
R&D consorti a i n th e U.S . starte d i n 1984 ; 2 3 year s afte r th e Japanes e 
government approve d th e Minin g an d Industria l Technologica l Research Association 
Law. Befor e 1984 , firms i n the U.S . could no t conduc t an y joint researc h du e t o th e 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 which prevented U.S . firms to join efforts t o pursue their 
collective interes t (Eva n & Oik, 1990). However, because of the succes s o f the VLS I 
Technology Research Association which made the Japanese semiconductor and computer 
companies leapfrog American manufacturers an d compete with U.S. products in the U.S. 
market and the announcement o f the Japanese fifth-generation compute r project, the U.S. 
microelectronics and computer technology industry sent a signal to the government . An 
initiation of R&D consorti a was started b y William Norris, the founder o f Control Data 
Corporation. Th e representative s fro m twent y companie s i n microelectronic s an d 
computer technology had an initial meeting in February 1982. In December 1982, twelve 
founding companie s establishe d th e Microelectronic s an d Compute r Technolog y 
Corporation (MCC ) a s a  Delawar e corporation , an d th e U.S . Department o f Justic e 
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announced it s intentio n no t t o challeng e th e collaborativ e formation . Th e researc h 
operation starte d i n Austin , Texas , i n Septembe r 1983 . Abou t 2 0 month s later , th e 
Department o f Justice issued the fina l approva l to the MC C withi n the framework of the 
National Cooperativ e Research Ac t of 1984 . The MC C becam e th e firs t majo r R& D 
consortia in the U.S. (Ouch i & Bolton, 1988). 
The MC C had th e goa l o f attackin g technica l problem s whil e reducin g th e 
technical risks on seven streams which included Artificial Intelligence/Knowledg e Based 
Systems, Database Management Systems, Human Interface Systems , Parallel Processing 
Architecture, VLSI Computer Aided Design, Semiconductor Packaging/Interconnect, and 
Expert Systems Software Technologies. 
The organizationa l formatio n o f th e MC C was differen t fro m th e VLS I 
association. The MCC hired technical staffs who were experienced, specialized, and elite 
scientists wit h significantl y higher wages tha n the comparabl e position s in the leading 
U.S. industria l research laboratories. Scientists from member companies were not utilized 
because member companie s were afrai d o f losing their qualified scientists. The budget 
came from the member companies. All members were required to fund at least one of the 
research streams for an initial period of three years in order to maintain continuity. Each 
member wa s abl e t o acces s onl y the intellectua l products fro m it s funde d programs . 
Information exchang e betwee n program s coul d occu r only after th e progra m managers 
executed arm's-length agreements. 
Al l th e researc h activitie s were conducte d i n the MCC-owne d laboratorie s an d 
performed onl y R&D necessar y t o produce a  working prototype. The commercial-scale 
volume production was performed individually by each member. Al l intellectual property 
32 
rights belonged to the MCC, not the member companies. However, those firms which had 
funded a research project had immediate licensing rights. The board of directors was able 
to gran t th e license s to othe r membe r firms . Thre e years afte r th e firs t license , all the 
MCC members would have automatic access to all licenses and the board had the right to 
grant licenses to non-MCC member companies (Ouchi & Bolton, 1988). 
Another cas e o f R& D consortia i s th e Pum p Researc h an d Developmen t 
Company (PRADCO) . Th e stor y starte d whe n fiv e companie s whic h dominat e th e 
specialized high-volum e pum p industr y submitte d a  researc h proposa l fo r a  majo r 
research contract with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI ) but the contract was 
awarded to a Swiss company who entered a key product market for a first time. From this 
loss, U.S . firm s realize d tha t thei r technolog y wa s behin d othe r competitors . I n 
September 1983 , three months afte r th e contrac t announcement , thes e fiv e companie s 
initiated a collaborative R&D unit driven by the director of technology of each member. 
PRADCO applie d t o th e Departmen t o f Justic e fo r approva l i n Octobe r 198 3 an d 
received approval in June 1985. 
PRADCO's organizationa l structure was also different from both MCC and VLSI 
project. PRADC O operate d a s a  holding company without any laboratory or scientist. 
The researc h activitie s were conducte d a t eac h member' s laboratorie s wit h it s own 
scientists. The technical committee drawn from al l o f the partners was set up to supervise 
each project . Informatio n sharin g betwee n eac h projec t wa s don e throug h visit s by 
research managers from one company to another, quarterly review meetings, and sharing 
of the working papers. 
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Besides these two R&D consortia , there were 13 5 more consortia registered a s of 
August 1989 . Thes e consorti a wer e forme d i n man y industrie s suc h a s agriculture , 
automotive, an d biotechnology industries . A t least twent y consorti a consis t o f foreign 
members and some US companies also are members of foreign consortia. 
The difference between R&D consortia in Japan and the U.S. 
Even though the U.S. and Japan have put the R&D consortia policy into an action, 
there wer e significan t difference s i n th e operationa l patterns . Japanes e researc h 
organizations were run as term projects with predetermined termination dates while in the 
U.S. collaboratio n worke d a s ope n entities . Th e researc h goal s fo r Japanes e R&D 
consortia wer e mor e focuse d tha n U.S . consorti a ones . Th e relationshi p betwee n 
members i n th e Japanes e organizatio n wa s les s forma l withou t extensiv e rule s an d 
detailed contract than in U.S. Moreover, U.S. consortia received the research budget from 
members while the Japanese research association acquired it from the government (Ouchi 
& Bolton, 1988). 
The differences betwee n Japanes e R&D consorti a and the U.S . R& D consorti a 
did not occur only in the major project s a s described above . Aldric h and Sasaki (1995) 
conducted a  surve y o n the characteristic s o f R&D consorti a whic h included 39 U.S. 
consortia and 54 Japanese consortia. Japanese consortia conducted their research by using 
only member facilitie s while U.S. consorti a also use joint facilities such as universities. 
The research o f U.S. consorti a focuses o n many stages of innovation whereas Japanese 
consortia are likely to concentrate on particular steps. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH QUESTION 
This dissertatio n aims to understand th e dynamic s of productivity growth fro m 
technology spillover through FDI in the Southeast Asi a region under the R&D consortia. 
This research targets to reproduce the historical data based on the relationship between 
each variable and apply it as a framework for policy analysis. Hypothesis testing, thus, is 
not applicabl e i n thi s research . I n orde r t o reac h thi s goal , th e ke y questio n t o b e 
answered is: 
Key Researc h Question : Wha t i s th e effec t o f th e R& D consortia polic y o n th e 
productivity growth from technolog y spillover through FDI in Thailand, Malaysia , and 
Vietnam in the short term and the long term? 
This key research question consists of three main parts. The first is the effect of 
the R&D consorti a policy on productivity growth from technology spillover. To answer 
this part, we wil l stud y the effec t o f the R& D consorti a policy on productivity growt h 
from technology spillove r i n a  countr y tha t wa s economicall y similar t o th e curren t 
economic situation in Thailand, Malaysia , and Vietnam a t the time the R& D consortia 
policy wa s implemente d suc h a s Japan . Th e secon d par t i s th e effec t o f the R&D 
consortia policy on productivity growth from technology spillover in Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam . Thes e thre e countrie s ar e selecte d a s a  representativ e sampl e fo r th e 
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Southeast Asi a regio n because these three countries represent around 38% of the total 
inward FDI in the Southeast Asi a region and around 88% if Singapore is excluded1. The 
last part is to study the effect in both short term and long term. In order to understand the 
dynamics of technology spillover, the observation of the change over time of the effect of 
the R& D consorti a policy on technology spillover is required. Both short term and long 
term scenarios are included in the study because in many cases short term benefits come 
with a long term pain (Sterman, 2000) such as that the high FDI growth rate will increase 
FDI in the shor t run but i t makes FDI drops faster i n the lon g run (Samii & Teekasap, 
2009). 
In orde r t o answe r th e ke y research question , these su b question s nee d t o b e 
examined. 
Sub Research Question 1: Which factors affect the productivity growth from technology 
spillover through FDI? 
This sub question is covered in the literature review on productivity growth and 
determinants o f technology spillover. Even though the factors that affect the technology 
spillover ca n be foun d fro m previou s literature , mos t o f the researc h use s regression 
techniques whic h sho w onl y th e correlatio n between th e factor s an d th e technolog y 
spillover, not the causality . The correlation can only show the relationship between two 
variables withi n a  fixe d environmen t durin g a  fixe d perio d o f time . However , the 
1 Calculate d from the dat a of inward FDI for each country from 200 1 to 2006 by IMF 
International Financial Statistics 
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correlation ca n b e change d whe n th e tim e perio d i s change d o r th e environmen t i s 
different. Thus , causalit y i s mor e essentia l whe n simulatin g a  situatio n tha t ha s no t 
happened befor e suc h as implementing the R& D consorti a policy in Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam. Therefore, the next sub question is: 
Sub Research Question 2: What is the relationship between eac h factor that affects th e 
productivity growth from technology spillover through FDI an d the technology spillover? 
To answe r this question, we create a model based on the causality assumption and 
simulate the model . The causality assumption i s accepted i f the simulatio n can trace the 
actual chang e in each variabl e i n the model . Actual dat a for Thailand , Malaysia, an d 
Vietnam wil l b e use d t o validat e th e causality , thus the effec t o f the R& D consorti a 
policy on the technology spillover is not included in the model. The next question is how 
the R&D consorti a policy affects the system. 
Sub Researc h Question 3: Wha t i s the effec t o f the R& D consorti a polic y o n eac h 
variable in the model? 
The mode l which is develope d t o answe r su b questio n 2  does not includ e th e 
effect o f the R& D consorti a policy . Th e effec t o f the R& D consortia polic y ca n b e 
studied when the mode l is applied to a  country that already implemente d suc h a policy 
which i s Japan . Th e causalit y assumptio n betwee n th e R& D consorti a policy  an d th e 
system i s tested and wil l b e accepte d i f the simulatio n can trace the actua l chang e of 
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variables in the countr y that uses the R& D consorti a policy during the period of policy 
implementation and after the policy is in effect. 
After th e effec t o f th e R& D consortia polic y o n productivit y growt h fro m 
technology spillover through FDI is understood, we will implement the effect o f the R& D 
consortia polic y o n th e mode l o f Thailand , Malaysia , an d Vietna m which has bee n 
developed in sub question 2 to answer the key research question. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To study the dynamics of productivity growth from technology spillover through 
FDI unde r th e R& D consorti a policy, the syste m dynamics method i s applied. System 
dynamics i s a  too l tha t ha s bee n develope d fro m feedbac k contro l syste m an d 
mathematical simulatio n (Sterman, 2000) to simulat e the problem. System dynamics is 
appropriate fo r this research because it can show the dynamics of the system s base d on 
the feedbac k an d non-linea r causalit y relationshi p betwee n eac h variabl e wit h tim e 
delays. Example s of applications are th e dynamic s o f cluster developmen t (Teekasap , 
2009) an d the oi l market (Sami i &  Teekasap, 2010) . Syste m dynamics has als o bee n 
implemented in a policy analysis because it can show the potentia l effect o f the policy 
when the polic y ha s no t ye t bee n implemente d suc h a s th e FD I policy effec t o n th e 
employment in a host country (Samii & Teekasap, 2009) 
Variables and data sources 
This dissertatio n adopt s th e sam e measuremen t o f productivit y growt h fro m 
technology spillover as most existing research (fo r example see Chuang and Lin (1999), 
Blomstrom an d Sjohol m (1999 ) an d Li u (2002) ) whic h consider s th e chang e i n 
productivity o f loca l firm s whe n foreig n firm s ar e i n the countr y a s th e technolog y 
spillover. This dissertation also focuses on the macro level, instead of the industry or the 
firm level . Therefore , th e productio n functio n i s use d t o explai n th e chang e i n 
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productivity (Cob b &  Douglas , 1928 ; Solow , 1957) . Fro m th e productio n function , 
production P  i s th e functio n o f Labo r L , th e Fixe d Capita l K , an d tim e t . Thus , 
productivity p which is the productio n P  per Labo r L is the functio n o f the capita l per 
labor k which is the fixed capital K divide by Labor L and time t. 
The Cobb-Dougla s productio n functio n i s applie d i n bot h micro - an d 
macroeconomic situation s an d ha s bee n use d widel y by neoclassica l economist s (fo r 
example se e Solow(1957)) . However, there was a  debate between th e economist s fro m 
the University of Cambridge which pointed out the drawback of the production function. 
The determination of capital is highly affected b y the rate of profit or the gap between th e 
price an d th e cos t wherea s th e neoclassica l assumptio n i s base d o n th e perfec t 
competition in which the price is determined by the demand and supply. Besides, without 
any mathematical restrictions , the integration of the production function of each sector is 
not equa l t o th e productio n functio n a s a  whole (Cohe n &  Harcourt , 2003 ; Harcourt , 
1972; Stiglitz, 1974). 
The measurement of a country's labo r productivity is the GD P pe r employmen t 
which is also used by the OEC D (OECD, 2008). The OECD measures productivity using 
GDP pe r hou r work . However , du e t o th e dat a limitatio n in obtaining th e numbe r o f 
working hours , w e assume that the averag e working hour pe r worke r i s constan t and 
equal i n all the countrie s i n the sample . Th e amount of fixed capital can be calculate d 
P = F(K,L;t) (4) 
p = A(t)f(k) (5) 
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from the gros s fixed  capita l formation which i s the chang e o f fixed  capita l each year. 
Even though the data on actual fixed capital for each year is not available, we can assume 
an initial fixed  capital in an earlier year and add up the gross fixed  capita l formation in 
the later year. After addin g the gross fixed capital formation for each year and deducting 
the depreciation , the initia l fixed  capita l does not significantl y affect th e curren t fixed 
capital (Samii , 1975) . Th e amoun t o f foreig n investmen t depend s o n th e economi c 
situation o f the countr y measure d b y the GDP . Anothe r factor i s the technolog y ga p 
between foreig n firms and loca l firms. Based on the definitio n of technology spillover 
stated before, technolog y gap can be referred t o as the productivity gap. Therefore , th e 
productivity ga p whic h i s th e differenc e betwee n GD P per employmen t betwee n th e 
home countries and host countries is used. 
The trade openness of the country which is indicated by the percentage of exports 
and imports is also affected th e amount of technology spillover (Meyer & Sinani, 2009; 
Wang, 1997). However, this dissertation focuses only on the technology spillover through 
FDI. Therefore, the effect of exports and imports is excluded from the model. The type of 
industry als o affect s th e leve l o f technology spillover . Hi-tech industrie s hav e lower 
technology spillove r compared t o low-tec h industrie s (Sermcheep , 2006) . However , 
because thi s dissertatio n focuse s o n Thailand , Malaysia , an d Vietna m wher e th e 
industries are labor intensive and low-technology, the type of industry is not considered. 
FDI flows into a country mainly because of two reasons - market seeking and low 
labor cost seeking - which can be justified by the GDP per capita. When FDI comes into 
a country, not only the productivity increases, the income of workers in that country also 
increases whic h leads to higher GDP per capita. However, in the case of low labor cost 
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seeking whic h applie s t o Thailand , Malaysia, an d Vietnam , a n increas e i n workers' 
income discourages FDI in the lon g run. The jump in salary starts when the number of 
working population almost reaches the limit or ,in other words, when the unemployment 
pool dries out (Samii & Teekasap, 2009). Therefore, unemployment is also a factor that 
should be included in the model. 
In sum , the lis t o f variables that wil l b e include d in the mode l as endogenou s 
variables (variable s tha t affec t an d ar e affecte d b y th e system) , exogenou s variable s 
(variables that affec t th e syste m but ar e no t affecte d b y the system ) an d the variables 
which are important but are not included in the model are shown in Table 1. The data of 
each variable can be obtained by the sourc e as shown in Table 2 through the Thomson 
DataStream database. 
Table 1: Model boundary 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
GDP per employment GDP per employment 
(Foreign) 
Company-level factors 
GDP Time Industry-level factors 
Fixed gross capital 
formation 
Non-Workforce Export/Import 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Employment 
Unemployment 
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Table 2: Source of data 
Name Measurement Data source 
Country Productivit y GDP/Employment 
GDP Economist Intelligence Unit 
Employment IMF International Financial Statistics 
GDP per Capit a GDP/Population 
Population IMF International Financial Statistics 
FDI FDI IMF International Financial Statistics 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
IMF International Financial Statistics 
Employment Employment IMF International Financial Statistics 
Unemployment Unemployment IMF International Financial Statistics 
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CHAPTER 5: TECHNOLOGY SPILLOVER MODEL 
The technology spillove r model i s create d t o simulat e th e productivit y growth 
from technology spillover through FDI . Factors which are included in the model consist 
of FDI , loca l investment , fixe d capital , employment, an d productivity . This chapter i s 
organized int o tw o sections : th e conceptua l mode l an d th e detaile d model . Th e 
conceptual model section provides the framework o f the model and aims for the readers 
to understand th e conceptua l interaction between eac h factor i n order to have good idea 
on th e structur e underneath th e simulatio n results whic h are show n i n the followin g 
chapters. Fo r readers who have a  technical background or wish to see the detail s of the 
model, th e detaile d mode l sectio n provide s th e complet e mode l with  detaile d 
calculations. Th e complet e list s o f equatio n an d symbo l use d i n th e mode l ar e i n 
Appendix 1 an d Appendix 3. 
Conceptual model 
The conceptual model shows the causal linkage framework between each factor in 
the system that explains the dynamic of productivity growth from technology spillover by 
the foreign direct investment. First , the productivity is calculated based on the production 
function with the effect o f the productivity gap and the shift of production factors which 
is represente d b y tim e (Solow , 1957) . W e ad d th e productivit y ga p t o represen t th e 
technology ga p betwee n foreig n firm s an d loca l firm s t o accoun t fo r th e effec t o f 
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technology spillove r (Kohpaiboon , 2006 ; Meye r &  Sinani , 2009 ; Sawada , 2005) . 
Therefore, the equation is: 
A = pF - p 
(6) 
(7) 
Given p is the country productivity; pp is the productivity of foreign firms; A is 
the technology gap; k is the capital per employment; and t is the year. 
Figure 2: Conceptual model with learning capability and foreign investment 
When the country productivity increases, the productivity gap (or technology gap 
in this paper) will decrease . A reduction in the technology gap increases the technology 
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transfer an d technology spillove r because the technolog y absorptiv e capabilit y of local 
firms increases (Meyer & Sinani, 2009; Sawada, 2005) . Increase in technology spillover 
will enhanc e the country' s productivit y a s show n b y Reinforc e Loo p 1  (Rl): Increase 
Learning Capability in Figure 2. 
An increas e i n countr y productivit y wil l amplif y rea l GD P and rea l GD P per 
capita. Large r GDP per capit a wil l encourag e foreign investmen t du e to a  better market 
opportunity. A  portion o f FDI wil l inves t i n fixed capita l which enlarges the country' s 
fixed capita l (Krkoska, 2001) an d also boosts the capita l per employment . Base d on the 
production function , large r capita l pe r employmen t wil l driv e u p th e country' s 
productivity as shown by R2: Foreig n Investment in Figure 2. The equation for R2 is: 
Y =  p*L (8 ) 
y = Y/N (9 ) 
FDI =  /(y) (10 ) 
K F =  /(FDI) (11 ) 
K =  KF + KL (12 ) 
k = K/L (13 ) 
Given Y is a real GDP; L  is the number of labor or employment; y  is the real GD P 
per capita ; N  i s the population ; FD I is the inwar d foreign direc t investment ; K p is th e 
fixed capita l investmen t b y foreig n firms ; K L is th e fixe d capita l investmen t b y loca l 
firms; and K is total fixed capital. 
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Figure 3: Conceptual model with local investment 
Fixed capita l investmen t doe s no t com e onl y fro m foreig n companies . Loca l 
investment als o contributes to a n increase i n fixed capital . Local investmen t growt h is 
assumed t o b e a t th e sam e rate as th e G D P growth . Loca l investmen t als o act s as a 
positive feedback whic h enlarges the rea l G D P ove r a period of time as shown by R3: 
Local Investment in Figure 3. The equations for local investment are: 
% Y =  ( Y T - Y t - i ) / Y t - i 
A D =  D * % Y 
K L =  / ( A D ) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
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Given %Y i s the GD P growth; D is the loca l investment; and AD is the change in 
local investment. 
Figure 4: Conceptual model with hiring from foreign and local firms 
Local and foreign investmen t does not onl y increase the fixe d capital. They also 
increase the employmen t whic h drives up the rea l GDP as shown by R4: Foreign Hiring 
and R5 : Local Hirin g i n Figure 4 . The equations for employmen t b y loca l and foreig n 
firms are : 
AL = HL + HF 
H L =  / ( D ) 
H F =  / ( F D I ) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
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Given A L is the change in employment; H L i s the hiring rate by local firms; and 
H F i s the hiring rate by foreign firms. 
Increase in real GDP will encourag e foreign and loca l investment whic h in turn 
increases employment a s discussed above . However , increase i n employment wil l dilute 
the capital per employment which in turn reduces the real GDP a s indicated by Balancing 
loop 1  (Bl): Dilute d Capital per Employment in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Full conceptual model 
Detailed model 
The model shown in the conceptua l mode l section provides the basic framewor k 
of the model. However, in order to make a model which can simulate and trace the actual 
data, we need to add more detail into the model. The complete detailed model is shown in 
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Figure 6  an d al l th e equation s ar e liste d i n Appendi x 1  with th e lis t o f symbo l i n 
Appendix 3. 
Figure 6: Full detailed model 
First, we start with the productivity and production functio n a s shown in Figure 7. 
The countr y productivit y i s calculate d from a  multiplicative facto r an d th e capita l pe r 
employment. Develope d fro m th e conceptua l equatio n 5 , the equatio n t o calculat e th e 
productivity is: 
cckpk (20) 
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Given a  i s th e multiplicativ e facto r an d p k i s th e coefficien t o f capita l pe r 
employment. 
Initial foreign 
productivity 
Figure 7: Detailed model with production function 
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The multiplicative factor a  account s for the effec t o f the technology ga p A and 
the time-dependent technical shift o n the productivity . We follow th e equatio n used by 
Solow (1957) and Kohpaiboon (2006). Thus, the equation of the multiplicative factor is: 
a =  Pae* XPtt + pAA ) (21) 
Given p a i s th e constan t coefficient ; p t i s th e tim e coefficient ; an d P A i s th e 
technology gap coefficient. 
However, the technolog y ga p use d i n the equatio n i s the perceive d technology 
gap, not the actual technology gap. The perceived value is the delayed value based on the 
publication duration and the people's perception which is anchored by the historical value 
(Sterman, 2000). In this case, the productivity data is delayed by the publication duration. 
Thus, the equation for multiplicative factor is: 
Given A is the perceived technological gap. 
The perceived technology ga p i s the exponentia l smoot h of the technology gap . 
People perceive the valu e of a variable based o n the historica l value. For example, we 
perceive a product i s $5 if the product's pric e has been set a t $5 for a period of time. If 
the price jumps to $7, we stil l perceive that its price should be at $5. The perception is 
changed to $7 if the price jumps and stays at $7 for a period of time. The perceived value 
is calculated from adding the current perceived value to the difference o f the actual value 
a = / ? a e
( / ? t t + / ? A A ) (22) 
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and perceived value divided by the duration people used in order to perceive the change 
of the value. Thus, the equation for the perceived technological gap is: 
(23) 
Given tA is the duration to perceive the technology gap. 
The technology ga p i s the differenc e betwee n productivit y of foreign firms and 
the countr y productivity. However, the productivity of foreign firms is not constant but 
increases ove r time. From the empirica l data the productivit y of a foreign fir m ha s a n 
exponential growt h with the foreig n productivity growth rate. Therefore, th e equation s 
are: 
Given g PF is the growth rate of foreign productivity. 
After w e hav e th e productio n function , w e expan d th e mode l t o includ e th e 
foreign investment an d the fixed capita l as shown in Figure 8. Starting with the country 
productivity, it has a time delay due to the data collection duration, publication duration, 
and th e tim e tha t people tak e to perceiv e th e data . Perceive d countr y productivit y is 
created t o represen t th e delaye d countr y productivit y dat a unde r th e exponentia l 
smoothing method. The equation for perceived country productivity is: 
pF(t+l) = p F(t)*(l+g PF) (24) 
(25) 
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Given tp i s the duration to perceive the country productivity . 
Figure 8: Detailed model with the foreign investment 
Based on the definition of productivity as the rea l GDP per employment (OECD , 
2008), the rea l GDP can be calculated from the multiplication of country productivity by 
the number of employment. W e use the equation 8  and 9 which are: 
Y = p *L (8 ) 
y = Y/N (9 ) 
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Foreign investmen t mainl y aim s fo r eithe r lo w labo r cost s o r marke t 
opportunities. For both types of FDI the objective can be justified by real GDP per capita. 
We assume that FDI and real GDP per capita have a linear relationship and thus we use 
the linear regression model to calculate the FD I from the GD P per capita. However, FDI 
also has a time delay because firms are usually conservative when making an investment 
in a n unfamilia r environmen t (Sterman , 2000) . Therefore , w e cal l i t Targe t FD I to 
represent the leve l that FDI should be at without a decision delay and FDI is the target 
FDI afte r accountin g fo r a  FD I investmen t decisio n dela y time . W e us e a  3-ste p 
exponential delay method as recommended fo r an investment decisio n making (Sterman, 
2000). Therefore, the equations are : 
FDI = fi PDI +  f3yy (26 ) 
FDI = J[CP2 - FDI)/DL]d t (27 ) 
lP2 = J[CFi-xF2yDL]dt (28 ) 
= \[(FDI - ¥i)/DL]dt (29 ) 
DL = tFDi/3 (30 ) 
Given FDI is the target FDI; PFD I is the constant coefficient; p y i s the coefficien t 
for GDP per capita; tpoi is the FDI delay time. 
Foreign investment wil l inves t a  portion of the tota l investment i n a fixed asset. 
An annual increase in fixed capita l is called Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF). We 
assume that the GFC F that comes from foreign investment an d the local investment have 
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a linea r relationship . Thus , w e us e th e linea r regressio n mode l t o calculat e th e 
relationship between GFC F and FDI. The equations are: 
a =  pa + aF +  a L (31) 
a F =  FDI* (32) 
Given a i s the GFCF ; p a i s the constant coefficient; aF is the foreign fixed capital 
investment; CT L i s th e loca l fixe d capita l investment ; y F i s th e foreig n fixe d capita l 
investment ratio. 
The accumulativ e fixe d capita l i s th e integratio n o f GFC F ever y yea r afte r 
deducting the depreciation. We assume a fixed depreciation ratio. Therefore, the equation 
for fixed capital is: 
Given 8 is the depreciation ratio. 
Fixed capital is used to calculate the capital per employment, which is used in the 
production function. We use equation 13 to calculate the capital per employment. 
Figure 9  show s th e detaile d mode l with  loca l investment . Loca l investmen t i s 
assumed to grow at the same rate as the GD P growth rate. However, because we do not 
K(t+l) = K(t) + a-K(t)*8 (33) 
k = K/ L (13) 
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have the data on local investment, the loca l investment inde x is set to represent the loca l 
investment with  th e valu e o f an initia l yea r a s 100 . First , w e us e th e equatio n 1 4 to 
calculate the GDP growth rate which is: 
% Y =  ( Y t - Y t - i ) / Y t - i (14) 
Figure 9: Detailed model with local investment 
The loca l investmen t i s delaye d du e t o th e investmen t decisio n process . 
Therefore, we create the Local investment growt h ratio as a delayed variable of the GDP 
growth usin g a n exponentia l smoothin g function . A  portio n o f th e loca l investmen t 
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contributes t o the fixe d capita l which in turn increases th e productivit y of the country . 
The equations for local investment are : 
Given %D is the loca l investment growt h ratio; to is the duration to make a local 
investment decision; Y L i s the local fixed capital investment ratio. 
The last part of the model is the hiring rate from local and foreign firms as shown 
in Figur e 10 . New investment fro m bot h loca l an d foreig n firm s wil l hir e additiona l 
workers. However , the numbe r o f worker s t o b e hire d i s limite d b y th e numbe r o f 
unemployed i n th e country . I n thi s model , w e creat e "Worke r o n deman d -
unemployment ratio " to represen t the rati o betwee n deman d an d suppl y o f additional 
workers. The equations are : 
H L =  A D * X L (37) 
(38) 
(39) 
Given A, L i s the loca l hirin g ratio; X?  i s the foreig n hiring ratio; S  i s the rati o 
between th e deman d worker s and the unemployment ; t L is the unemploymen t coverag e 
duration; U is the unemployment 
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FDI constant coef 
Figure 10: Detailed model with local and foreign hiring 
In general, the worker demand - unemploymen t ratio is equal to the percentage of 
unemployment that is hired if the work demand-unemployment ratio is between 0 and 1. 
However, i f th e deman d o f additiona l worker s almos t reache s th e numbe r o f 
unemployment, the hirin g ratio i s lower than the worke r demand-supply rati o because 
there is a possibility that the qualification of unemployed may be lower than the firms ' 
requirement. Whe n the worke r demand-supply rati o i s almost zero , the hirin g rati o is 
higher than the demand-suppl y rati o because there are som e industrie s that stil l nee d 
additional worker s whil e othe r industrie s d o not . Th e employmen t functio n i s th e 
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function that indicates the hiring ratio from worker demand - unemploymen t ratio and it 
is shown in Figure 11. Therefore, the equations for the hiring rate are: 
H =  U * / ( S ) / tH 
L(t+1) = L(t) + H 
(40) 
(41) 
Given H is the hiring rate; ta is the hiring duration. 
employment function 
1 
Figure 11: The relationship for the employment function 
The workforc e grow s continuously . Th e ne w workforc e start s fro m bein g 
unemployed and are hired later. The number o f workforce plus number of non-workforce 
is the number of total population. 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
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0(t+l) = 0(t)*(l+g0) (46) 
Given W is the numbe r of workforce; w  is the workforc e growt h rate; gw i s the 
workforce growth ratio; O is the number of non-workforce; g o is the growth ratio of non-
workforce 
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CHAPTER 6: MODEL VALIDATION 
Model validation is required when creating any model to check the correctness , 
accuracy, and robustness of the model in order to ensure that the simulation results from 
the model are reliable. Many methods have been recommended to check the reliability of 
the model (Forrester & Senge, 1980; Sterman, 2000). However, in this paper, we validate 
the model by using the dimension consistency method, the behavior reproduction test, the 
family member method, the extreme condition test, and the model forecastability method. 
Dimension consistency method 
The dimension consistency method tests the uni t consistency o f each variable in 
the model to ensure that the unit s o f all the key-i n variables and all the calculate d ones 
are consisten t throughou t th e entir e mode l an d th e mode l doe s no t ad d apple s wit h 
oranges and comes ou t with banana. Besides , the uni t check i s also useful i n checking 
variables with strange combinations of units which do not represent the actua l situation 
such as Dollar/(Person * Year). 
This mode l ha s bee n checke d fo r dimensio n accurac y b y usin g th e Vensim' s 
built-in function for dimension consistency check. This function tests the unit uniformity 
by examinin g every equation in the model . The test result indicate s that the mode l has 
unit consistency . Th e lis t o f unit s an d equation s o f al l th e variable s ar e show n in 
Appendix 1. 
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Behavior reproduction test 
The behavio r reproductio n tes t is used to determine ho w wel l the model ca n 
reproduce the actual change o f each variable. The test is conducted b y comparing the 
simulation data with the empirical data using statistical tools such as the R an d the Mean 
Absolute Percentage Erro r (MAPE). The model can reproduce the behavior well i f the R2 
is high and the MAPE is low. 
This researc h ha s conducted the behavior reproductio n tes t by replicating the 
change o f each variable of Thailand, Malaysia , Vietnam, and Japan. The details of the 
test and the test results are shown in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. In general, the results show 
that the model can significantly reproduce the change o f variables related to FDI and 
productivity growth from technology spillover. 
Family member test 
The family member test assesses the ability of the model to reproduce the result in 
the other systems whic h are simila r to the system the model was built for. This test can 
check if al l key variables are included in the model. 
The model in this research has been tested for the family member test by applying 
the model to Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. These three countries are similar in terms 
of the relationship between FD I and productivity growth from technology spillover. The 
results, described in detail in Chapter 7, show that the model can considerably replicate 
the behavio r o f FDI and productivit y growth fro m technolog y spillove r in Thailand , 
Malaysia, and Vietnam. 
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Extreme condition test 
The extrem e conditio n test i f the mode l ca n handl e a n extrem e situation . An 
extreme situation is a situation that rarely happens but the result of that situation could be 
predicted theoretically. 
In this research , w e test the robustnes s of the mode l by assuming that the FDI 
flow int o the countr y is stopped. Thi s situation is not a  usual situation but happened t o 
Malaysia durin g the 199 7 Asian Financia l Crisis. I n 1998 , Malaysia impose d a  stron g 
capital flow contro l to cope with the Asian Financial crisis which almost eliminated the 
inflow of investment. However, the Malaysian economy did not collapse from the lack of 
foreign investment but still grew due to the domestic drives. However, theoretically, even 
though the economy was stil l growing without FDI, it would have grown at a slower rate 
because of the limitin g capital . Therefore, w e expect t o se e the slowe r growth of GDP 
when FDI is blocked. 
We use Thailand's model (the parameters of the model is explained in Chapter 7) 
as th e stud y case . W e assume that the inflo w o f FDI has bee n stoppe d sinc e 1990 . 
However, the foreign firms which had already invested in the country are not affected by 
the loss of FDI. 
Figure 1 2 compares th e rea l GD P of Thailand if the inflo w o f FDI had bee n 
stopped sinc e 1990 with the base case which foreign investment volum e did not change . 
The simulation result presents that the rea l GDP when the inflo w o f FDI i s blocked is 
significantly lowe r tha n th e bas e cas e whic h follow s th e theoretica l assumption . 
Therefore, the model passes the extreme condition test. 
64 
R e a l G D P 
Figure 12: Result of the surprise behavior test 
Model forecastability test 
The model forecastability test examines i f the model can determine the data in the 
next time period based o n the historical data. The model forecastability test is conducted 
by removin g th e dat a o f the las t yea r an d then simulatin g th e mode l base d o n the 
coefficients whic h is obtained from the existing data. The comparison between empirical 
data and simulation is compared using statistical method. 
We use Thailand as the case study for the model forecastability test. We use data 
from 1988 to 2008 in the model. To test for forecastability, w e simulate the model by 
using the coefficients determine d from the data from 1988 to 2000 to forecast th e data of 
2001. Then we simulate the model using the coefficients determine d fro m the data from 
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1988 to 2001 to forecast the data of 2002. We continue the process until the data of 2008 
is forecasted . I n this section the explanatio n is focused on the detail s of this test. The 
detailed calculation of the coefficient determination is explained in Chapter 7. 
The resul t of the model forecastability test on the country productivity, GDP per 
capita, an d FD I is show n in Table 3 . Fro m th e results , th e simulatio n can trace th e 
historical dat a o f the country' s productivity , GDP per capita , and FDI . Therefore , th e 
model can significantly forecast the value one year ahead. 
Table 3: The  results of the model forecastability test 
R 2 MAPE 
Productivity 0.7748 4.65% 
GDP per capita 0.7822 4.23% 
FDI 0.5277 19.15% 
Note: MAPE = Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
In summary , th e develope d mode l ha s bee n teste d usin g th e dimensio n 
consistency method, the behavior reproduction test, the family member test, the extreme 
condition method, and the forecastability test. The test results indicate that the model is 
moderately robust . Therefore , thi s model is used fo r the stud y o f productivity growth 
from technology spillover through FDI under the R&D consortia policy in the Southeas t 
Asia region in the following chapters . 
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CHAPTER 7: MODEL PARAMETERIZATION 
The model described in Chapter 5  is used to replicate the actual data of Thailand, 
Malaysia, an d Vietna m i n orde r t o validat e th e mode l an d provid e th e foundatio n 
structure to analyze the R& D consortia policy. The raw data for Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam is listed in Appendix 2. The model is simulated usin g local currencies because 
the real GDP and GFCF data are only available in the local currencies. In addition, due to 
the availability of the empirica l data, the simulatio n period for Thailand and Malaysia is 
from 198 8 to 2008 and fo r Vietnam is from 199 6 to 2008 . Th e required parameter s to 
simulate th e mode l ar e th e coefficien t fo r workforce , non-workforce , productivit y o f 
foreign firm, country productivity, FDI, GFCF, and hiring rate. 
Thailand 
Thailand has ha d a  significant growt h of inward FDI, productivity and GDP per 
capita since 1987 , except for the Asian Financial Crisis period, as shown in Figure 13 and 
Figure 14. In this section, we determine the parameters used in the model to replicate th e 
growth of Thailand's FDI, productivity, and GDP per capita based on the empirical data. 
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Figure 13: FDI and productivity of Thailand during 1987 - 2008 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and Economist Intelligence Unit 
Figure 14: GDP per capita of Thailand during 1987 - 2008 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
The firs t grou p of variables to be determined i s the workforce , non-workforce , 
and foreig n productivity . Thes e variable s gro w exponentiall y withou t an y effec t fro m 
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other factors. Therefore , the required coefficient for these variables is the initia l value in 
1988 which is the start year and the growth rate. The general equations used to determin e 
the coefficients are : 
Y = Y0(l+g)
1 (47) 
ln(Y) = ln(Y0) + t*ln(l+g) (48) 
Given Yo is the initial value at the starting year, g is the growth rate, and t is time. 
The workforc e i s calculate d fro m addin g th e numbe r o f employmen t an d 
unemployment. Th e difference betwee n the population and the workforce i s the numbe r 
of non-workforce. In terms of foreign productivity, Japan has the highest share of foreign 
investment b y countr y i n Thailand 2. Therefore , th e productivit y o f Japan , whic h is 
calculated from  th e rea l GD P pe r employment , i s use d t o represen t th e foreig n 
productivity. Becaus e th e mode l i s simulate d unde r th e Tha i Bah t currency , th e 
productivity of Japan was converted from Japanese Yen (JPY) to Thai Baht (THB). The 
coefficient for each variable is shown in Table 4. 
The nex t ste p is to calculat e th e coefficien t fo r countr y productivity . Country 
productivity is calculated from capital per employment, time, and the technology gap. A 
regression mode l use d t o determin e th e coefficien t i s develope d fro m equatio n 6  a s 
shown below. 
ln(Productivity) = b0 + biln(Capital per employment) + b2time + b3techgap (49 ) 
2 Th e Board of Investment o f Thailand 
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Table 4: Coefficient  for workforce, non-workforce,  and  foreign productivity for Thailand 
Workforce Non-workforce Japan productivity 
Yo 30,571,000 24,616,000 1,240,000 
g 0.00854 0.0114 0.0496 
R 2 0.9099 0.9323 0.8602 
There i s a possibility that the technology gap i s a delayed variable because the 
technology transfe r an d spillove r requir e a  significan t perio d o f tim e t o happen . 
Therefore, a  model with a 1-year lag technology gap is also studied and compared with 
the equation without a time lag. The results shown in Table 5 indicate that the model with 
no time lag in the technology gap represents the actua l data better. Thus, the coefficient 
of the model without time lag is used in the model. This result can be explained based on 
the delay of the technology gap data. The published technology gap data is the delay of 
actual data due to the data collection and publication process. The time delay of the data 
availability reduce s th e effec t o f the tim e shif t betwee n th e technolog y ga p an d th e 
productivity. 
The next coefficient to be studied is the coefficien t for FDI . The level of FDI is 
determined by the country' s personal wealth which is indicated by the GD P per capita. 
We assume that the relationship between FDI and GDP per capita is linear. Therefore, the 
equation is: 
FDI = b0 + biGDP per capita (50 ) 
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Table 5: Coefficient  for productivity for Thailand 
Techgap Techgap(-1) 
Constant -27.86*** -22.81* 
ln(Capital per employment) 0.3346*** 0.2940*** 
Time 0.01766*** 0.01533** 
Technology gap -8.45 x 10"8** N/A 
Technology gap (-1) N/A -3.17 x l O - 8 
R2 0.9751 0.9583 
Adjusted R 2 0.9707 0.9505 
Remark: *** p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p<0.1 
However, an investment i s likely to have a  significant time delay because firms 
are likel y t o b e conservativ e whe n makin g a n investmen t decisio n in a n unfamiliar 
environment (Sterman, 2000). Therefore, we compare the results from the model with no 
time lag, 1-year time lag, and 2-year time lag as shown in Table 6. The results indicate 
that the model with the 2-year lag has the highest adjusted R 2. Therefore, the coefficient 
of the 2-year time lag model is used. 
The next step is to determine th e coefficien t fo r GFC F an d employment hiring . 
Both variables share the same independent variables : FDI and change in local investment 
(LIC) as presented i n equation 51 and 52. 
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Table 6:  Coefficient for FDIfor Thailand 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Constant -2.939x 10"*** -3.246 x 1011*** -3.658 x 1011*** 
GDP per capita 9.569 x 106*** N/A N/A 
GDP per capita (-1) N/A 1.054 x 107*** N/A 
GDP per capita (-2) N/A N/A 1.177 x 10'*** 
R 2 0.6227 0.6894 0.7630 
Adjusted R 2 0.6028 0.6722 0.7491 
We als o study the model with a time delay in LIC because there is a significant 
time delay in the investmen t decisio n process. However , we do not stud y the dela y of 
FDI because the FD I dat a comes from an international source which incurs a significant 
time delay from the actual FDI. The results for GFCF and employment hiring are shown 
in Tabl e 7 and Table 8  consecutively. The 1-yea r lag model for GFC F i s the best fit; 
however the mode l with no time lag is the best fit for Employment hiring. The reason 
why th e no time lag model has the highest R i s that most foreign investment in Thailand 
is i n labor intensive industrie s whic h d o not requir e significan t time to trai n workers. 
Therefore, th e firm s d o no t hav e t o hir e th e worker s i n advanc e befor e investing . 
Therefore, the coefficients from these two models are used. 
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Table 7:  Coefficient for GFCF for Thailand 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Constant 7.685 x 10 11*** 7.272 x 10 11*** 9.684 x 10 11*** 
FDI 2.864*** 2.633*** 1.957** 
LIC 2.262 x 1010* N/A N/A 
LIC(-l) N/A 3.402 x 10 1U*** N/A 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A 2.364 x 10 1U** 
R 2 0.4654 0.6352 0.4497 
Adjusted R2 0.4025 0.5896 0.3764 
Table 8: Coefficient for employment hiring for Thailand 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Constant -2.961 x 10 3 8.680 x l O 4 4.284 x l O 5 
FDI 2.35 x 10" 7 2.30 x 10" 7 -1.07x10"'' 
LIC 3.767 x 10 4** N/A N/A 
LIC(-l) N/A 2.245 x 10 4 N/A 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A -7.660x 10" 
R 2 0.2221 0.0875 0.0110 
Adjusted R2 0.1306 -0.0266 -0.1208 
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The overal l regression result s support the assumptio n tha t there is a  significan t 
delay i n the availabilit y of the technolog y ga p dat a and also in the investmen t decisio n 
making process. However, the decision making duration for foreign investment i s longer 
than th e decisio n perio d o f th e loca l investmen t becaus e foreig n investmen t endure s 
higher risk stemming from the unfamiliar business environment. Whe n the parameters are 
included into the model, the simulation can reproduce the change of actual data in various 
variables as shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Comparison between empirical data and simulation for Thailand 
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Malaysia 
Malaysia also has ha d a  continuous hig h growth of GDP, GD P per capita , FDI, 
and productivity since 1987 except for the Asian Crisis period as shown in Figure 15 and 
Figure 16. Inward FDI into Malaysia significantly dropped during the Asian crisis due to 
strict financial controls and the denia l to accept the IM F package. However , the leve l of 
FDI jumped back after the crisis period which indicates the strong economic foundatio n 
of Malaysia. In this section , we analyze the empirica l data of Malaysia to determine th e 
coefficient to be used in the model in order to simulate the FDI, GDP, and productivity of 
Malaysia. 
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Figure 15: GDP and GDP per capita  of Malaysia during 1987 - 2008 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
Figure 16: Inward FDI and productivity of Malaysia during 1987 - 2008 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and Economist Intelligence Unit 
The coefficien t fo r Malaysi a i s determine d usin g th e sam e metho d a s fo r 
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Thailand. The workforce, non-workforce, and foreign productivity are assumed to have 
an exponential growth and the coefficient s fo r these three variables are shown in Table 
10. Japan's productivity is used to represent the foreig n productivity because Japan has 
the highest share of total investment in Malaysia3. 
Table 10:  Coefficient  for  workforce,  non-workforce, and foreign productivity  for 
Malaysia 
Workforce Non-workforce Japan productivity 
Yo 6.559 x 10b 1.047x 10 ' 1.295 x 10' 
g 0.0266 0.0210 0.0435 
R2 0.9779 0.9931 0.8781 
The next step is to obtain the coefficient for the equation for productivity which 
we also used for Thailand as shown above in equation 49. The result is shown in Table 
11. 
The relationship between FD I and GD P pe r capit a is studied using equation 50 
which was used for Thailand as well. The models with no time lag, 1-year lag, and 2-year 
lag were compare d because of the significan t time delay from the investmen t decision 
making process . Th e result s show n i n Tabl e 1 2 presen t a  differen t outcom e fro m 
Thailand. For Malaysia, the model with no time lag has the highest adjusted R 2 and it is 
the on e used in the syste m dynamics model. This result indicates that foreign investors 
perceive that Thailand is riskier than Malaysia. 
3 Malaysia n Industrial Development Authority 
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Table 11:  Coefficient for productivity for Malaysia 
Constant -34.38*** 
ln(Capital per employment) 0.2915*** 
Time 0.0210*** 
Technology gap -9.88 x 10"7** 
R2 0.9772 
Adjusted R2 0.9732 
Remark: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p<0.1 
Table 12:  Coefficient for FDI  for Malaysia 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Constant -1.08 x 101U** -6.65 x 10y -4.88 x l 0 y 
GDP per capita 1.651 x 10b*** N/A N/A 
GDP per capita (-1) N/A 1.425 x 106*** N/A 
GDP per capita (-2) N/A N/A 1.358 xlO 6 *** 
R2 0.5835 0.4286 0.3660 
Adjusted R 2 0.5616 0.3968 • 0.3287 
Remark: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
The equation s fo r GFC F an d Hirin g rat e ar e th e sam e a s th e one s use d fo r 
Thailand which are equation 51 and 52. The models with no time lag, 1-year lag, and 2-
year lag are als o compared to check the investmen t delay . The result fo r GFC F show s 
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that the 1-yea r lag model has the highest adjusted R 2 as indicated in Table 13. Table 14 
shows the results for employment hiring. The results for employment hiring for all time 
lag show s a  negative coefficien t fo r FD I which i s not theoreticall y correct . Thus , we 
studied the model without a constant variabl e and the results show a positive coefficient 
which complies with the theory. Therefore, the model without a constant coefficien t and 
time lag is selected. 
Table 13: Coefficient  for GFCF  for Malaysia 
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Table 14: Coefficient  for employment hiring for Malaysia 
The results from the regression also support the assumption of a significant time 
delay of variables and the relationship between them. After inputtin g the parameter int o 
the model, the simulation and the empirical data match to some extent as shown in Table 
15. 
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Table 15: Comparison between empirical data and simulation for Malaysia 
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Note: MAPE = Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
Vietnam 
The economy of Vietnam has been growing exponentially during the last couple 
years afte r Vietna m reduce d th e foreig n investmen t barrie r a s observe d b y th e 
comparatively stable FD I from 199 6 to 2006, and then i t significantly increase d in the 
last two years as shown in Figure 18. However, even though FDI during the early period 
was limited , the GD P and the GD P per capita of Vietnam were gradually growing at a 
constant rate . Productivity grew constantly as well . In this section we aim to reproduce 
these empirica l dat a b y simulatin g th e develope d syste m dynamic s model . Th e 
coefficients used in the model are determined from the regression equations similar to the 
ones used for Thailand and Malaysia. 
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Figure 17: GDP and GDP per capita of Vietnam, 1995  - 2008 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
Figure 18: FDI and productivity of Vietnam, 1996  - 2008 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and Economist Intelligence Unit 
To determine the coefficients for Vietnam we use data from 199 6 to 2008, instead 
of 198 8 to 2008 , becaus e o f the dat a availabilit y limitation . Moreover , th e dat a on 
86 
employment and unemployment ar e not available . However, the data on workforce and 
percentage of unemployment ar e available . Nevertheless, to prevent th e roundin g bias, 
we separate the growth of the workforce and the population. Therefore, the coefficient for 
population will be studied instead of non-workforce. The results are shown in Table 16. 
Table 16:  Coefficient for workforce, population, and  foreign productivity for Vietnam 
Workforce Population Japan productivity 
Yo 3.4535 x 10v 7.3464 x 10' 7.211 x l O 8 
g 0.0241 0.0135 0.0499 
R 2 0.9868 0.9984 0.8990 
The productivity coefficient for Vietnam is calculated by using the same equation 
as we used for Thailand and Malaysia. The result is shown in Table 17. 
Table 17:  Coefficient for productivity for Vietnam 
Constant -57.98*** 
ln(Capital per employment) 0.0634 
Time 0.02364*** 
Technology gap -5.26 xlO" 1 1 
R 2 0.9980 
Adjusted R2 0.9974 
Remark: *** p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
87 
The relationship between FDI and GDP per capita of Vietnam is not linear, but it 
is in an exponential form. From the empirica l data, the FDI in last couple years jumped 
significantly above the early years. Therefore, the regression model used to determine the 
relationship between FDI and GDP per capita is: 
ln(FDI) = b0 + bi*GDP per capita (53 ) 
We also compare the models with no time lag, 1-year lag, 2-year lag, and 3-year 
lag to determine the time delay of an investment. A model with a high degree of time lag 
is studied because Vietnam has recently opened the economy . Therefore, i t is likely to 
have higher risk and uncertainty for foreign firms as compared to Thailand and Malaysia. 
A highe r degree of decision time represents higher risk that foreign companies woul d 
perceive. The results in Table 18 show that the model with a 3-year lag can explains the 
change of FDI better than other models. 
The next step is to study the equations fo r GFCF and employment hiring. The 1-
year lag model of GFCF, shown in Table 19, has the highest adjusted R 2 compared to the 
other tim e lag models. This is the sam e as the result s fo r Thailand and Malaysia . The 
equation fo r employmen t hirin g ha s th e sam e negative coefficien t proble m which we 
observed i n th e Malaysi a model . Th e mode l with  a  2-yea r lea d show s a  positiv e 
coefficient. Thus , the coefficient from the model with the 2-year lag shown in Table 20 is 
used. 
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Table 18:  Coefficient for FDI for Vietnam 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 3-year lag 
Constant 28.63*** 28.15*** 27 49*** 26.77*** 
GDP per capita 6.03 x 10" 7*** N/A N/A N/A 
GDP per capita (-1) N/A 7.5 x 10" 7*** N/A N/A 
GDP per capita (-2) N/A N/A 9.45 x 10" 7*** N/A 
GDP per capita (-3) N/A N/A N/A 1.19 x 10"**** 
R 2 0.6522 0.7327 0.8064 0.8512 
Adjusted R z 0.6206 0.7059 0.7849 0.8326 
Table 19:  Coefficient for GFCF for Vietnam 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Constant -6.71 x 10 1"** -7.18 x 1013** -6.53 x 10u 
FDI 2.013*** 1.242*** 1.221** 
LIC 1.94xl01 J*** N/A N/A 
LIC(-l) N/A 2.45 x 10 1J*** N/A 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A 2.66 x 101J** 
R 2 0.9678 0.9736 0.9571 
Adjusted R2 0.9606 0.9670 0.9448 
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Table 20: Coefficient for employment hiring for Vietnam 
Constant 
No lag 
Constant 
1-year lag 
Constant 
2-year lag 
No 
constant 
No lag 
No 
constant 
1-year lead 
No 
constant 
2-year lead 
Constant -1.38x10s -1.65x10s 1.07x10s N/A N/A N/A 
FDI -4.69x10"y -8.87x10"y -8.68x10~y 
** 
-4.37x10"y -1.18xl0'8 3.83xl0-y 
LIC 1.19x10s 
** 
N/A N/A 1.06x10s 1.27x10s 
*** 
9.35xl04 
LIC(-l) N/A -1.45x10' 
** 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A 1.39 x10s 
** 
N/A N/A N/A 
R 2 0.5403 0.4120 0.5021 0.5325 0.3312 -0.4133 
Adjusted 
R 2 
0.4381 0.2650 0.3598 0.4858 0.2569 -0.5900 
Based on the results, Vietnam is considered by foreign firms as higher risk than 
Thailand and Malaysia which is shown by a longer foreign investment delay. In spite of 
this, Vietnam stil l attracts a significant number o f foreign investments. Th e simulatio n 
results afte r parameterizatio n ar e show n i n Tabl e 21 . Th e result s indicat e tha t th e 
simulation can explain the change of the actual data to some degree. 
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Table 21: Comparison between empirical data and simulation for Vietnam 
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Note: MAPE = Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
Result comparison between Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
The regression results o f the relationship between the variable s that affected th e 
FDI and productivity of Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam show the similaritie s and the 
differences o f these three countries. First , the result s sugges t that these three countries 
have a strong foundation to attract foreign investment as shown by the significant growth 
in FDI after the 199 7 Asian Financial crisis. Furthermore, there are a signs of the shift in 
industrial concentratio n fro m lo w labor cos t industrie s t o technology-base d industrie s 
indicated by an increase in GDP per capita, FDI, and the productivity. 
Even though Thailand , Malaysia, an d Vietnam have a  continuous FD I growth, 
Malaysia ha s th e shortes t FD I delay tim e wherea s Vietnam' s FD I delay tim e i s th e 
longest. Thi s result ca n be interpreted tha t MNEs perceiv e Vietnam as a  risky country 
comparing to Thailan d and Malaysia . Thi s explanation is supported b y the Corruption 
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Perception Inde x (CPI) 4 score s provide d by Transparency Internationa l an d Economi c 
Freedom Index5 by The Heritage Foundation for which Vietnam has the lowest score and 
Malaysia has the highest score. 
4 CP I 2009 Ranking for Vietnam is 120, Malaysia is 56, and Thailand is 84 out of 180 
countries. 
5 Economi c Freedom Inde x 201 0 Rankin g fo r Vietna m i s 144 , Thailan d is 66 , and 
Malaysia is 59 out of 179 countries. 
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CHAPTER 8: EFFECT OF THE R&D CONSORTIA POLICY - CASE OF JAPAN 
The effect o f the R& D consorti a policy o n FDI and the technology spillover is 
studied through the case of Japan. Japan is similar to Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam in 
many ways . First , Japa n i s i n Eas t Asi a whic h i s geographicall y close t o Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam which are in the Southeast Asi a region. Then, Japanese culture is 
based o n collectivis m instea d o f individualis m an d s o i s th e cultur e i n Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam. Furthermore, Japan used to be a source of low labor cost which 
is the current situation that Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam have been facing. Therefore, 
Japan is used as a reference cas e to study the effect o f the R&D consortia policy on FDI 
and technology spillover. 
Japan model 
The Japanese economy was based on the low skilled cheap labor . However, the 
R&D consortia policy, as well as other factors, shifted the core competitiveness of Japan 
from cheap labor into one of the world's technology leaders (Aldric h & Sasaki, 1995). 
The R&D consorti a policy has been initiated by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry of Japan since 1961. However, we analyze the data from 198 8 to 2008 due to the 
data availability limitation. 
95 
Figure 19: GDP and GDP per capita  of Japan, 1988  - 2008 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
Figure 20: FDI and productivity of Japan, 1988  - 2008 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and Economist Intelligence Unit 
Japan has a  fairl y stabl e GDP and GD P per capit a as show n in Figure 19 . Th e 
inward FD I i s considerabl y lo w compare d t o developin g countrie s suc h a s Thailand , 
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Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, the productivity has continuousl y increase d a s shown 
in Figure 20. In general, these graphs broadly present the differenc e o f the relationshi p 
between FDI and productivity between Japan which has alread y implemente d th e R& D 
consortia policy and Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam which have not. 
First, we determine the coefficient fo r foreign productivity. The U.S. productivity 
is used t o represent the foreig n productivit y because the U.S . has th e highes t share of 
foreign investmen t i n Japan 6. Base d o n th e data , th e U.S . productivit y grow s 
exponentially. Therefore, th e parameters for the U.S . productivity are estimated using the 
exponential model as shown in equation 48. The regression resul t is shown in Table 22. 
Table 22: Coefficient for US  productivity 
US Productivity 
Y 0 7,574,100 
g 0.0180 
R 2 0.9903 
Then th e numbe r o f workforc e an d non-workforc e i s calculated . Th e dat a 
indicates the workforce and non-workforce have a 3rd-order polynomial pattern with 1988 
given a s yea r 1 . Therefore , w e use a  3 rd-order polynomial function fo r workforc e an d 
non-workforce. Th e result is shown in Table 23. 
6 Ministr y of Finance, Japan 
97 
Table 23: Coefficient for workforce and non-workforce 
Workforce Non-workforce 
Constant 5.993 x 10'' 6.184 x 107 
t 1.662 x 106 1.134 x 10b 
t2 1.149 x 105 1.065 x 105 
2,410 2,605 
R 2 0.9746 0.9226 
The equation to determine the coefficien t for Japan's productivity is the same as 
the one for Thailand which is equation 49. The regression result is shown in Table 24. 
Table 24: Coefficient for productivity for Japan 
Constant -19 17*** 
ln(Capital per employment) -0.0496** 
Time 0.0180*** 
Technology gap -6.69 xlO" 8** 
R 2 0.9931 
Adjusted R2 0.9919 
The next step is to fin d th e relationshi p between FD I and GDP pe r capita . We 
used equation 50 to determine the coefficient s o f FDI and the GD P per capita. We also 
studied the time delay between FD I and GDP per capita by examining regressions wit h 
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no time lag, 1-year lag, and 2-year lag . The results show n in Table 25 indicate that the 
model with 1-year lag has the highest R 2. This can be interpreted that even though Japan 
is a  develope d countr y wit h les s ris k compared t o Malaysia , Thailand , and Vietnam, 
foreign firms still require time to make an investment decision due to the fierce domestic 
competition. Therefore , th e coefficien t o f the 1-yea r lag model is implemented i n the 
system dynamics model. 
Table 25: Coefficient of FDIfor Japan 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Constant -5.59 x 1012** -6.10 x 1012** -6.38 x 1012** 
GDP per capita 1.576 x 106** N/A N/A 
GDP per capita (-1) N/A 1.72 x 106*** N/A 
GDP per capita (-2) N/A N/A 1.82 x 106** 
R 2 0.2967 0.3190 0.2990 
Adjusted R 2 0.2596 0.2812 0.2578 
The last two equations ar e the regressions to determine the coefficient for GFC F 
and Hiring rate which are equation 51 and 52. We studied the GFCF model with different 
time lag s t o estimat e th e fixe d capita l investmen t dela y fro m foreig n an d loca l 
investment. Th e result s sho w that th e mode l with  a  4-yea r la g provides th e bes t fi t 
compared to the other models as presented in Table 26. This result indicates that the local 
investment does not invest in fixed capita l immediately. Local firms require a significant 
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amount o f time to mak e a  decision on fixed capita l investment. Fo r the employment 
model, the results show that the 2-year lead model provides the highest R a s presented in 
Table 27 . I t indicate s that both loca l an d foreign firms are likel y to withhol d human 
resource investment unti l they believe that the firms can operate the business and then 
they will hire workers. 
Table 26: Coefficient of GFCF for Japan 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 3-year lag 4-year lag 
Constant 1.33xl014*** 1.30xl014*** 1.29x014*** 1.27xl014*** 1.26x014*** 
FDI -6.311* -6.224* -6.034* -6.078* -5.248* 
LIC 1.27 x 10" N/A N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-l) N/A 1.76 x l O 1 2 N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A 2.06 x 1012 N/A N/A 
LIC(-3) N/A N/A N/A 2.29 x 1012* N/A 
LIC(-4) N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.23 x 1012* 
R 2 0.1877 0.2793 0.3019 0.3360 0.3568 
Adjusted 
R 2 
0.0922 0.1892 0.2089 0.2412 0.2578 
Remark: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 27: Coefficient  of employment hiring for Japan 
No time lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 1-year lead 2-year lead 
Constant -7.55 x 104 -1.67 x 10' 9.49 x 10 J -1.33x10' -2.66 x 10 4 
FDI -1.26 x 10" 7 -1.54 x 10" v -1.71 x 10" 7 N/A N/A 
FDI(-l) N/A N/A N/A -2.53 x 10" 7 
** 
N/A 
FDI(-2) N/A N/A N/A N/A -1.66x10"'' 
LIC 1.78 x 10' 
*** 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-l) N/A 1.92 x 10' 
*** 
N/A 1.89x10' N/A 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A 8.96 x 104 N/A 8.29 x l O 4 
R2 0.5446 0.6156 0.2565 0.6714 0.1933 
Adjusted 
R 2 
0.4910 0.5676 0.1574 0.6304 0.0857 
The simulatio n results after inputtin g the coefficient into the model indicate that 
the model can moderately reproduce the change in variables that relate to the FDI and 
technology spillove r o f Japan. Th e comparison between th e empirica l dat a an d the 
simulation is shown in Table 28. 
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Table 28: Comparison between empirical data and simulation for Japan 
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Note: MAPE = Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
Result comparison between Japan and Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
The coefficients for the model of Japan are different fro m those of the model of 
Thailand, Malaysia , an d Vietnam in many ways . First, the coefficien t t o calculat e the 
country productivity focuses o n different factors . A s shown in Table 29, the capita l per 
employment has less impact on the productivity in Japan than in Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam. For the effec t o f the technology gap on the productivity, Japan, Thailand, and 
Malaysia utilize the technology gap at fairly the same level and at a significantly higher 
level than Vietnam. 
The next calculation is the effect o f the GDP per capita on FDI. We compare only 
between Japan , Thailand , and Malaysi a because the mode l for Vietnam uses differen t 
equation. The results i n Table 30 show that each country has a  different tim e delay for 
foreign investment. Malaysi a has no time lag while Thailand has a 2-year time lag. Thi s 
result can be interpreted a s Thailand being perceived by foreign firms as having higher 
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risk than Malaysia and thus they would require a longer period to collect the information 
and make an investment decision . Another explanation is because the process related to 
FDI i n Thailand is more bureaucrati c tha n tha t i n Malaysia . Therefore , foreig n firms 
require longe r time to initiat e the business . Japa n has a  1-yea r time lag which can be 
explained throug h th e loca l competitio n dimension. The loca l companie s i n Japan ar e 
technologically advanced and hold a strong foothold in the market. Therefore, to invest in 
Japan, foreig n companies nee d t o compet e head-to-hea d wit h Japanese firms. For this 
reason, foreig n firms are likel y to withhold an investment t o gather information before 
investing in Japan. 
Table 29: Comparison between the coefficients of the productivity between countries 
Japan Thailand Malaysia Vietnam 
Constant -19.17*** -27.86*** -34.38*** -57.98*** 
ln(Capital per 
employment) 
-0.0496** 0.3346*** 0.2915*** 0.0634 
Time 0.0180*** 0.01766*** 0.0210*** 0.02364*** 
Technology gap -6.69 xlO"*** -8.45 x 10"8** -9.88x10"'** -5.26 x l O - 1 1 
Remark: *** p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
The decision to invest in fixed capital is also different amon g countries. Japanese 
firms are likel y to hold back the fixe d capita l investment a s indicated by having a long 
time delay while the local firms in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam require on average 1 
year fo r a  fixe d capita l investment . Moreover , foreign investmen t i n Japa n reduces , 
105 
instead of increasing, the fixed capita l investment. I t is because of the direct competition 
effect that foreign firms and local firms in Japan target the same market and both types of 
firms are strong. Therefore, i f foreign firms successfully invest in Japan, they wil l take a 
portion of the market share from Japanese firms and some local firms may not be able to 
survive. Therefore, the coefficient of FDI on gross fixed capital formation is negative. 
Table 30: Comparison of the coefficient of FDI between countries 
Japan Thailand Malaysia 
Constant -6.10 x 1012** -3.658 x 1011*** -1.08 x 101U** 
GDP per capita N/A N/A 1.651 x  106*** 
GDP per capita (-1) 1.72 x 10b*** N/A N/A 
GDP per capita (-2) N/A 1.177 x 107*** N/A 
The hiring pattern in each country is also different. Thailan d and Malaysia do not 
have a  time delay while Japan has a  1-year delay and Vietnam has a  2-year delay . This 
indicates that in Japan and Vietnam, firms are not likely to make a commitment by hiring 
workers immediately but they wait for a period of time to gather information and observe 
the busines s environmen t an d then hire the workers . In addition, FDI in Japan reduces 
employment whic h ca n b e explaine d throug h a  competitio n model . I n othe r words , 
foreign firms are likely to have direct competition with local firms which may push some 
local firms out of business and thus the employment is reduced. 
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Table 31: Comparison of the coefficient of GFCF between  countries 
Japan Thailand Malaysia Vietnam 
Constant 1.26 x lO 1 4 *** 7.272 x 1011*** 7.272 x 10 11*** -7.18 x 10"** 
FDI -5.248* 2.633*** 2.633*** 1.242*** 
LIC N/A N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-l) N/A 3.402 x 10 10*** 3.402 x 10 10*** 2.45 x 101"*** 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-3) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-4) 2.23 x 10 r2* N/A N/A N/A 
Table 32: Comparison of the coefficient of employment hiring between countries 
Japan Thailand Malaysia Vietnam 
Constant -1.33 x l O 5 -2.961 x 103 N/A N/A 
FDI N/A 2.35 x 10" 7 2.28 x 10_b N/A 
FDI(-l) -2.53 x 10~7** N/A N/A N/A 
FDI(-2) N/A N/A N/A 3.83 x 10_y 
LIC N/A 3.767 x 104** 1.344x104** N/A 
LIC(-l) 1.89 x 10 s*** N/A N/A N/A 
LIC(-2) N/A N/A N/A 9.35xl04 
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CHAPTER 9: EFFECT OF R&D CONSORTIA POLICY ON THAILAND, 
MALAYSIA, AND VIETNAM 
In previou s chapters , w e hav e explaine d th e mode l structur e t o stud y th e 
relationship between FDI and productivity growth through technology spillover. Then we 
applied the model to Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam to replicate the empirica l data in 
order to use the model as the foundation for policy analysis. Subsequently, we studied the 
FDI an d productivit y growt h from  technolog y spillove r in Japa n whic h had alread y 
implemented the R&D consortia policy in order to analyze the effect o f the policy on the 
variables related to the FDI and the technology spillover . In this chapter, we wil l apply 
the effect o f the R& D consorti a policy on the relationship between FD I and productivity 
growth from the technology spillover which is acquired from Japan's model to the model 
of Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. This allows us to study the implications of the R& D 
consortia policy on the productivity growth from technology spillover in these countries. 
This chapter focuse s o n the analysis of the R& D consorti a policy on productivity 
growth from technology spillover through FDI in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The 
study does not aim to forecast wha t would happen in the future bu t to show the effect of 
R&D consorti a on the developmen t o f technology spillove r in these countries sinc e the 
simulation environment ma y change. Therefore , th e simulatio n results ar e show n using 
the simulation iteration instead of the year to avoid the misunderstandings . 
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Implementing R&D consortia in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
Productivity growt h fro m technolog y spillove r ca n b e studie d throug h th e 
calculation of the country's productivity in the model. Country productivity is determined 
by capita l per employmen t an d a  multiplicative factor. Capita l per employmen t i s not 
related t o the technolog y spillove r therefore w e focus o n the multiplicativ e factor. Th e 
multiplicative facto r consist s o f the effec t o f the technolog y ga p an d a  time dumm y 
variable representing th e change in technology, innovation, and management technique. 
The R&D consortia policy affects both factors in a multiplicative factor because the R& D 
consortia policy is expected to reduce the technology gap between loca l and foreign firms 
and also stimulate technology and innovation research. Therefore , to implement the R& D 
consortia policy in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam, the coefficient of the multiplicative 
factor i s modified. Japan i s used as the representative cas e of a country using the R& D 
consortia policy. Therefore, the coefficient of the multiplicative factor of Japan is used in 
the mode l fo r Thailand , Malaysia , an d Vietna m when th e R& D consortia polic y i s 
implemented. 
We assume that the R& D consorti a policy i s implemented i n 2008 which is the 
last yea r o f the empirica l data we have . Th e R& D consorti a polic y i s modeled t o b e 
gradually implemented and to be folly implemented by 8 simulation iterations in order to 
observe the dynamics of the change of country productivity and technology spillover in 
Thailand, Malaysia , an d Vietnam . Th e mode l i s als o simulate d fo r 1 2 simulatio n 
iterations afte r 200 8 to observe the effec t o f the R& D consorti a policy during and afte r 
the implementation. 
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Effect o f th e R& D consorti a polic y o n productivit y growt h fro m technolog y 
spillover in Thailand 
When implementing the R& D consorti a policy to Thailand , the productivit y of 
Thailand increases significantly compared to the case without the R& D consorti a policy 
as shown in Figure 21. This result indicates that the R& D consorti a policy can improve 
the productivity growth from technology spillover in Thailand. 
Country Productivity 
Figure 21: Comparison between the productivity of Thailand with and without the R&D 
consortia policy 
The GDP per capit a als o increase s extensively from the R& D consorti a policy 
compared to the graph of the GDP per capita without the R&D consortia policy as shown 
in Figure 22. This result suggests that people in Thailand will gai n benefits b y having a 
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higher average income if the government uses the R&D consortia policy. 
GDP per Capita 
Figure 22: Comparison between the  GDP per capita of Thailand with and  without the 
R&D consortia policy 
FDI als o gro w exponentiall y whe n Thailan d implement s th e R& D consortia 
policy as presented in Figure 23. This result indicates that even though productivity and 
technology spillove r in Thailand are high , foreig n firm s ar e stil l willin g t o inves t in 
Thailand to gain market opportunity which is identified by the higher GDP per capita. 
I l l 
Figure 23:  Comparison  between the  FDI  of  Thailand  with and without  the  R&D 
consortia policy 
In summary , th e R& D consorti a polic y ca n encourag e th e productivit y growth 
from the technolog y spillove r through FD I as show n b y a  continuou s increas e i n the 
productivity of Thailand. Increase in productivity also drives up the wealth of people in 
Thailand as indicated by a higher GDP per capita. With higher GDP per capita, Thailand 
becomes a  market opportunity for foreign firms. Even though foreign firms are likely to 
lose their technology through technology spillover and have more direct competition with 
local firms  du e t o th e increas e i n productivit y o f th e loca l firms,  th e countr y 
attractiveness fro m highe r GD P per capit a stil l outweigh s th e ris k an d result s i n an 
increase in FDI. 
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Effect o f th e R& D consorti a polic y o n productivit y growt h fro m technolog y 
spillover in Malaysia 
The R& D consorti a policy improves the productivity , people's wealth , and also 
attracts more foreign investment i n Malaysia. First , the productivity of Malaysia grows 
notably from the R&D consortia policy when compared with the case without the policy 
as shown in Figure 24. This result shows that the R& D consortia policy can improve the 
productivity growth from technology spillover through FDI in Malaysia. 
Country Productivity 
Figure 24: Comparison between the productivity of Malaysia with and without the R&D 
consortia policy 
The wealth of people in Malaysia, measured by the GDP per capita, also increases 
significantly by the R& D consorti a policy as presented in Figure 25. This result can be 
explained because the R&D consorti a policy improves the productivity of the workers in 
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Malaysia, people i n Malaysia on average gain higher income which is indicated by the 
higher GDP per capita. 
Figure 25: Comparison between the  GDP per capita  of Malaysia with and  without the 
R&D consortia policy 
Even thoug h ther e i s a  debat e tha t havin g highe r technolog y spillove r may 
discourage foreign investment (Sawada, 2005), the result in this study shows the opposite 
outcome. Th e foreig n investmen t i n Malaysia increase s exponentiall y when th e R&D 
consortia policy is initiated as presented in Figure 26. Foreign firms may be discouraged 
by higher technology spillover . However, higher technology spillover enlarges th e GDP 
per capit a o f people i n Malaysi a whic h also increase s th e countr y attractivenes s a s a 
location for market opportunity. The benefits o f providing a market opportunity outweigh 
the loss from technology spillover. Therefore, FDI in Malaysia increases. 
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FDI 
Figure 26:  Comparison  between the  FDI  of  Malaysia  with  and without  the  R&D 
consortia policy 
In summary , th e R& D consorti a polic y support s the productivit y growth from 
technology spillove r through FD I in Malaysia. Th e higher productivity from the R& D 
consortia policy also increases the wealth of people in Malaysia indicated by the higher 
GDP pe r capita . Wit h highe r GD P per capita , Malaysi a become s mor e attractiv e t o 
foreign investment as a growing market opportunity. Even though there is a risk of losing 
the proprietary technology through technology spillover, acquiring market opportunity is 
more essential. Therefore, the R&D consortia policy can also drive the FDI up. 
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Effect o f th e R& D consorti a polic y o n productivit y growt h fro m technolog y 
spillover in Vietnam 
The results also sho w an improvement i n country productivity , GD P per capita , 
and FDI in Vietnam if the R& D consorti a policy  is utilized. In Figure 27, i t shows that 
the R& D consortia polic y can extensivel y increas e the productivit y o f Vietnam . This 
result indicate s tha t the R& D consortia polic y can encourag e the productivit y growt h 
from technology spillove r through FDI in Vietnam. 
Country productivity 
Figure 27: Comparison between the productivity of Vietnam with and without the R&D 
consortia policy 
The GDP per capita of Vietnam is also driven up by the R& D consortia policy as 
shown i n Figur e 28 . Becaus e th e R& D consortia polic y support s th e productivit y i n 
Vietnam, people in Vietnam can produce more output which then increases their average 
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income. Therefore, the GD P per capita of Vietnam when the R& D consorti a policy is in 
place is enlarged. 
GDP per Capita 
Figure 28: Comparison between  the  GDP per capita  of Vietnam  with  and  without the 
R&D consortia policy 
FDI in Vietnam grows significantly from the R& D consorti a policy as presented 
in Figur e 29 . FD I increases du e t o a  notable improvemen t i n the GD P per capit a of 
Vietnam which is the result of a development i n productivity from technology spillover. 
Therefore, eve n though the R& D consorti a policy increases technology spillove r which 
amplifies the risk of foreign firms losing their technology knowledge, an increase in GDP 
per capita still outweighs the risk. 
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FDI 
Figure 29: Comparison  between the FDI of Vietnam with and without the R&D consortia 
policy 
In summary , th e R&D consorti a polic y can encourage the productivity growth 
from technology spillove r through FD I in Vietnam. Increase in productivity enlarges the 
GDP per capita which in turn attracts more FDI into Vietnam. 
Comparing th e benefits of the R&D consortia policy between Thailand, Malaysia , 
and Vietnam 
From the study, Thailand , Malaysia, and Vietnam gain significant benefits fro m 
implementing the R&D consortia policy in terms of increasing the country's productivity, 
GDP per capita, and the volume of FDI. However, the degree of the benefits eac h country 
obtains i s different . Whe n comparin g th e benefit s th e countr y woul d obtai n fro m 
implementing the R&D consorti a policy in terms of increasing in the productivity, GD P 
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per capita, and the volume of FDI between Thailand , Malaysia, and Vietnam at the 1 2 
simulation iteration, Malaysia has the most benefits i n terms of the productivity and the 
GDP pe r capit a whil e Vietnam has th e leas t benefits . However , when comparin g th e 
percentage gains in terms of FDI, Vietnam has the highest benefit s follow s by Thailand 
and Malaysia as shown in Table 33. 
Table 33: Comparison  of  the benefits  of  the R&D  consortia policy at  the  end of the 
simulation 
Thailand Malaysia Vietnam 
Productivity 53.52% 55.81% 10.49% 
GDP per capita 53.54% 60.27% 10.50% 
FDI 32.24% 27.05% 40.73% 
The differences i n the benefits eac h country obtain can be explained through th e 
level o f the economi c developmen t o f the countr y an d th e ris k perception o f foreign 
investors towar d th e country . Vietna m ha s recentl y opene d it s econom y whic h i s 
indicated b y the volum e o f inflo w o f FDI . Th e inflo w o f FDI into Vietna m jumped 
significantly from  200 6 whic h suggest s tha t ther e i s a  chang e i n th e investmen t 
environment that reduces the foreign investment barrier. Besides, Vietnam is perceived as 
a countr y wit h high corruption an d lo w economic freedo m whic h is indicate d by th e 
lowest scor e i n Corruption Perception Inde x an d Economi c Freedom Index . Wit h th e 
perception o f corruption an d lo w economic freedo m an d the unfamiliarit y for foreig n 
investors, Vietna m i s considere d a s th e countr y wit h th e highes t investmen t ris k 
compared to Thailand and Malaysia. However, because of the low labor cost in Vietnam, 
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Vietnam can attract significant FDI and became the country with the highest FDI growth 
since 2006 compared to Thailand and Malaysia. 
Malaysia is on the opposite side of the spectrum. Foreign investment in Malaysia 
has grown steadily since 1988 which is the starting year of the simulation except during 
the 199 7 Asia n Financia l Crisi s period . Foreig n investor s perceiv e Malaysi a a s th e 
country with  lo w corruption an d hig h economi c freedo m compare d t o Thailan d and 
Vietnam which indicates by the highest rank in CPI and Transparency Internationa l and 
Economic Freedo m Inde x amon g three countries . Thailan d is i n the middl e betwee n 
Malaysia an d Vietnam . Th e FD I i n Thailan d i s als o graduall y growin g whil e th e 
perception on corruption and transparency i s lower than Malaysia. 
Based o n the simulatio n result, Malaysi a gain s the mos t benefit s i n term o f an 
increase i n countr y productivit y from the R& D consortia policy , the n Thailan d and 
Vietnam has th e leas t benefi t fro m it . Vietnam benefits th e leas t because Vietnam has 
many factors that support the growth of productivity from the economy expansion beside 
the R& D consorti a policy while most factor that encourages th e technology spillover in 
Thailand and Malaysia is matured. 
Even thoug h Malaysi a gain s mor e productivit y advantage tha n Thailan d and 
Vietnam, Thailand and Vietnam can attract more FDI from the R& D consorti a policy. 
This is because economy of Thailand and Vietnam is still growing compared to Malaysia 
and foreig n capita l i s required t o driv e the economi c growth i n these two countries . 
Therefore, th e governmen t o f Thailand and Vietnam provides supporting infrastructur e 
and environment to attract more FDI i f the GDP per capita increases than Malaysia. 
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Although the FDI benefits in Vietnam and Thailand is higher than in Malaysia, it 
takes longer time until FDI significantly increase s after the policy implementation. This 
is base d o n the ris k perceptio n o f the foreig n investor s an d th e effectivenes s o f the 
bureaucratic process . Vietnam has the longes t time lag between polic y implementation 
and the effec t o n the FDI growth because Vietnam has the highest risk. With high risk, 
foreign investor s tak e longe r tim e t o mak e a n investmen t decisio n to collec t more 
information. The ineffective FDI-related process also lengthens the FDI delay time. 
Discussion on the effect of the R& D consortia policy on productivity growth from 
technology spillover through FDI in the Southeast Asia region 
The R&D consortia policy is the policy that encourages loca l and foreign firms to 
conduct collaborative R&D. Th e R&D consorti a policy increases th e effectivenes s an d 
efficiency o f R& D activitie s du e t o th e knowledg e sharin g betwee n firm s an d th e 
economies o f scale whic h als o increase th e technolog y skil l o f the firms . Wit h better 
technology skills, local firms can increase their productivity. An increase in productivity 
means that the worker s can produce more output i n a year. Therefore , o n average th e 
population in that country can earn more income as measured by the GD P per capita if 
the R& D consorti a policy i s implemented. With highe r average incomes , that country 
becomes a  market opportunity for foreign firms and thus inflow o f foreign investment 
increases. When the FDI increases, an investment in fixed capita l also increases whic h 
feeds back into a productivity growth. Besides, the productivity growth also increases the 
competitiveness of local firms which drives up the loca l investment . Wit h higher local 
investment, the fixed capital investment is also enlarged which becomes another suppor t 
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to add up the productivity growth. In summary, the R& D consorti a policy can increas e 
the productivity, GDP pe r capita, and the volume of FDI o f the implemented country. 
Sawada (2005 ) argue d tha t higher technolog y spillove r will discourag e foreig n 
investment becaus e foreign firm s nee d t o inves t mor e t o preven t th e leakag e o f their 
technology. However , the result s fro m thi s stud y sho w the missin g part o f his study . 
Technology spillover , b y itself , ma y discourag e FD I bu t technolog y spillove r als o 
increases the GD P pe r capita of that country which in turn increases the attractiveness fo r 
the marke t seekin g FDI . The opportunitie s obtaine d fro m a  highe r GD P per capit a 
outweigh the additiona l investment foreig n firms have t o inves t to preven t technolog y 
spillover. Thi s resul t als o support s the finding s o f the U-shape d technolog y spillover 
discussed b y Meye r an d Sinan i (2009 ) whic h indicate s tha t productivit y spillove r 
increases i f the average income of the host countries increases beyon d the critica l point. 
As th e averag e income grows by an increase i n productivity, technology spillove r will 
increase i f the country productivity is increased which are also the results o f this study. 
Besides, th e mode l indicate s tha t the fixe d capita l investe d b y bot h loca l an d 
foreign firm s is more significant than the additiona l employment. Thi s is proved by the 
value of fixed capita l per employment. As the FDI and local investment grow , the firms 
invest i n fixe d capita l a s wel l a s hir e additiona l workers . Fro m the simulation , fixe d 
capital per employmen t increase s significantl y over time. Thus, new investment would 
invest more i n fixed capita l than human capital . In other words , the ne w investment i s 
capital intensive instead of labor intensive. 
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CHAPTER 10: POLICY ANALYSIS IF R&D CONSORTIA POLICY WAS 
IMPLEMENTED IN THE PAST 
The previous chapter explain s the benefits tha t Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
will acquir e if the R& D consorti a policy is implemented in 2008. However, there is one 
shortcoming o f the analysi s i n the previou s chapter . The policy analysi s i s studied by 
comparing two simulations - on e simulation is the case that the R& D consorti a policy is 
implemented an d anothe r case i s not . I n thi s chapter , w e analyz e th e effec t o f R& D 
consortia i f it were implemente d i n Thailand, Malaysia, an d Vietna m in the pas t and 
compare the results with the historical data which is the situation that the R&D consortia 
policy was not implemented. 
We assume that the R& D consorti a policy is selected t o be implemented by the 
government o f Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam to recover the econom y after th e 199 7 
Asia Financia l Crisis . Th e polic y i s assume d t o b e implemente d i n 200 0 an d full y 
implemented in 2002. The result of the simulatio n is compared with the empirical result 
and the simulation without the policy implementation. 
Thailand 
We assume that the R& D consorti a policy was implemented in Thailand in 2000 
and* took 2 years to be fully implemented . The effect o f the R& D consortia policy on the 
productivity of Thailand is shown in Figure 30. The result indicates that the productivity 
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of Thailand grew significantly if Thailand had implemented the R&D consortia policy in 
2000. 
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Figure 30: Comparison between the productivity of Thailand with and without the R&D 
consortia policy and the actual data 
The result of the effect o f the R&D consorti a policy on GDP per capita as shown 
in Figur e 3 1 provide s th e sam e resul t a s th e effec t o f th e polic y o n Thailand' s 
productivity. If Thailand had implemented the R& D consorti a policy in 2000, the GDP 
per capita would have increased significantly and approximately doubled the actual GDP 
per capita in 2008. 
Regarding FDI in 2008, i f the R& D consorti a policy had been implemented in 
2000, FDI would be significantly higher than the actua l one as presented in Figure 32. 
However, it took a couple years to notice the effect o f the R& D consorti a policy on the 
FDI. Thi s resul t support s the findin g in the las t chapte r tha t even thoug h Tha i firm s 
became th e direc t competitor s o f foreig n firms , FD I stil l gre w du e t o th e marke t 
opportunity. 
GDP per Capita 
Figure 31: Comparison between the  GDP per capita  of Thailand with and  without the 
R&D consortia policy and the actual data 
In summary, Thailand would be in a better position if the R& D consorti a policy 
had been implemented i n the past. The country productivity as wel l a s GD P per capita 
would be approximately double and FDI would be more than double of the real situation. 
However, this simulatio n is based o n the assumptio n tha t there are n o problems i n the 
implementation process and there is no reduction in the productivity of local firms during 
the implementatio n process . A  real implementation may provoke the disagreemen t an d 
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protests from foreign firm s as well as local agents who would lose their benefits from th e 
policy. 
FDI 
Figure 32:  Comparison  between the  FDI  of  Thailand  with  and without  the  R&D 
consortia policy and the actual data 
Malaysia 
The effec t o f th e R& D consortia policy  o n Malaysi a i f th e policy  ha d bee n 
implemented in 2000 is compared with the simulatio n i f the polic y was not implemented 
and the empirica l data to determine the siz e of the consequence s of the policy . First, th e 
effect o f the R& D consortia policy on the productivity o f Malaysia is shown in Figure 33. 
The resul t i s simila r t o th e effec t o f the policy  o n th e productivit y o f Thailand . Th e 
productivity o f Malaysia would have increased significantly i f the R& D consorti a polic y 
was implemented. 
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The GDP per capit a in Malaysia would hav e als o increase d significantl y i f the 
R&D consortia policy was implemented as presented in Figure 34 . This indicates that the 
R&D consortia policy can improve the wealth of people in Malaysia. 
The effect o f the R& D consorti a policy on FDI of Malaysia has a  smaller effec t 
than in Thailand a s presented in Figure 35 . However, FD I in Malaysia would have stil l 
been higher than the actual situation if the R& D consorti a policy had been implemented 
which shows that the R&D consortia policy increases the FDI attractiveness o f Malaysia. 
Country Productivit y 
Figure 33: Comparison between the productivity of Malaysia with and without the R&D 
consortia policy and the actual data 
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GDP per Capita 
Figure 34: Comparison between the  GDP per capita  of  Malaysia with and  without the 
R&D consortia policy and the actual data 
FDI 
Figure 35:  Comparison  between the  FDI  of  Malaysia  with  and without  the  R&D 
consortia policy and the actual data 
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In summary, Malaysia , as well as Thailand, would gain significant benefits fro m 
the R& D consorti a policy  i f the polic y wa s implemented . Th e R& D consorti a polic y 
would driv e up the Malaysi a productivity and GD P per capita , whic h make Malaysi a 
more attractive for foreign investment. 
Vietnam 
Vietnam is an interesting case to study the effec t o f the R& D consorti a policy if 
the policy had been implemented in the past because the foreign investment into Vietnam 
jumped since 2006 which indicates that foreign investors started to perceive Vietnam as 
an investment opportunit y and the foreign investment barrie r in Vietnam was reduced in 
2006. Even though foreign investment wa s limited in 2000, the productivity of Vietnam 
could have grown significantly from the R&D consortia policy as shown in Figure 36. 
Because o f th e increas e i n productivit y fro m th e R& D consortia polic y a s 
discussed before , Vietnam' s populatio n o n averag e gaine d bette r incom e whic h i s 
indicated by the higher GDP per capita in Figure 37. 
Even though the actua l FDI started to be significan t from 2006, the model does 
not incorporat e th e busines s environmen t tha t limite d th e inflo w o f FDI before 2006 . 
Instead, we assume that the business environmen t outsid e the mode l boundary doe s not 
change during the simulation period. Based on the unchanged business environment , FDI 
in Vietna m woul d increas e significantl y i f th e R& D consorti a polic y ha d bee n 
implemented in 2000 as shown in Figure 38 
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Country productivity 
Figure 36: Comparison between the  productivity of  Vietnam with and  without the R&D 
consortia policy and the actual data 
GDP per Capita 
Figure 37: Comparison between  the  GDP per capita  of Vietnam  with  and  without the 
R&D consortia policy and the actual data 
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FDI 
Figure 38: Comparison between the FDI of Vietnam with and without the R&D consortia 
policy and the actual data 
Generalization o f th e effec t o f th e R& D consortia policy i f th e polic y ha d been 
implemented in the past 
The study on the effect o f the R&D consortia policy on productivity growth from 
technology spillove r though FD I in the Southeas t Asi a regio n i f the polic y ha d bee n 
implemented in the past generally shows the benefit s o f the polic y on the econom y and 
well-being of population in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The R&D consortia policy 
could driv e u p th e productivit y o f countrie s i n Southeas t Asia . A n increas e i n 
productivity also increases th e averag e income of the population in each country. Even 
though loca l companie s becom e direc t competitor s o f foreig n firms  du e t o highe r 
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productivity, the highe r averag e income als o attract s more FD I because of the marke t 
opportunity. 
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CHAPTER 11: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECT OF THE R&D 
CONSORTIA POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
Previous chapter s demonstrate d tha t th e R& D consortia polic y woul d hav e 
benefited Thailand , Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, in the previous analysis, the focus 
is mainly on the effect o f the policy without considering the implementation process. The 
implementation process ca n affect th e result of the policy as well as the policy itself. In 
this chapter, we focus the analysi s on the implementation process o f the R& D consorti a 
policy by using sensitivity analysis method. 
We focu s o n tw o dimension s o f th e policy  implementation ; implementatio n 
duration an d th e reactio n o f th e foreig n firm s towar d th e R& D consortia polic y 
implementation. It is not clear if the duration to implement the policy affects th e result of 
the policy. Rapid changes can provoke strong resistance an d can be costly but it may also 
instantly push the countr y int o a  better competitive position. In this analysis , we focus 
only o n th e effec t o n th e polic y with  differen t implementatio n period s withou t 
considering the cos t of implementation. If the differen t implementatio n periods create a 
significant change in the effect o f the policy, it would be worth to further stud y the cos t 
of implementation and compare the costs and the benefits. I f the result is not significantly 
different, th e governmen t shoul d implemen t th e polic y i n a  wa y tha t minimize s th e 
implementation cost and resistance. 
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Another dimensio n t o b e studie d i s th e reactio n o f foreig n investor s o n th e 
implementation o f the R& D consortia policy . Sawad a (2005 ) argue d tha t MNE s ar e 
discouraged i f the hos t countr y ha s highe r leve l o f technology leakage . MNE s ma y 
conclude that the technolog y leakag e woul d increas e fro m th e R& D consorti a policy. 
Thus, implementin g th e R& D consortia polic y ma y creat e a  negativ e effec t o n th e 
decision making of foreign investors. 
We study the effec t o f the R& D consorti a policy implementation process on the 
Thailand model. The different implementatio n duration is implemented in the model by 
varying th e policy  implementatio n duration . Th e negativ e reactio n o f th e policy 
implementation on FDI is studied by adjusting th e coefficient of the FDI equation when 
the policy is implemented. 
Implementation duration 
We stud y th e effec t o f implementatio n duratio n b y alterin g th e perio d t o 
implement th e polic y i n the model . We compare 3  cases of differen t implementatio n 
duration with  th e cas e "N o Policy " a s a  bas e cas e with  n o R& D consortia polic y 
implementation. "Policy" case is the scenari o that the polic y requires 8  iterations t o be 
fully implemente d which is the case that we considered in the previous chapters. "Short" 
and "Long" cases are the situation that the implementation duration lasts for 4 iterations 
and 12 iterations respectively. 
The effect s o f differen t R& D consorti a policy  implementatio n period s o n th e 
result of the policy in Thailand are presented in Figure 39, Figure 40, and Figure 41. The 
implementation duration affects th e country productivity and GDP per capita in the short 
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term. However, the difference become s narrower in the long term. To be specific, short 
implementation duration makes the country productivity and GDP per capita significantly 
higher than the long implementation duration. 
Country Productivity 
Figure 39: Effect of  the implementation  duration of  the R&D  consortia policy on the 
productivity of the country 
The effect o f the implementation periods on the FDI is not significant in the short 
term bu t i n the lon g term i t i s significan t a s show n in Figure 41. The effec t o f the 
implementation duration is unclear in the shor t term because of the delay time between 
the polic y implementatio n and the effec t o f the policy on FDI as discussed in previous 
chapters. 
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GDP per Capita 
Figure 40: Effect  of the implementation  duration  of  the R&D  consortia  policy on the 
GDP per capita 
FDI 
Figure 41: Effect of the implementation duration of the R&D consortia policy on the FDI 
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The underlining reason of the significan t effect o f the implementation periods on 
the country's econom y in the shor t term and insignificant effect i n the long term can be 
examined through the first-order difference o f the variable in the system. In this study, we 
observe th e chang e of the GD P growth as presented in Figure 42. The growt h o f the 
variables grows faster i f the policy is implemented in a short period. However, the growth 
rate also drops faster than i f the policy is implemented in a long period when it passes the 
peak growth rate. Therefore, the difference i n policy implementation time has less effec t 
in the long term than in the short term. 
GDP Growth 
Figure 42: Effect of  the implementation  duration  of the R&D  consortia policy on  the 
GDP growth 
In summary , implementin g th e R& D consortia polic y usin g differen t polic y 
implementation duratio n create s a  differen t outcome . Wit h faste r implementation , th e 
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country can gain more benefits i n term of higher countr y productivity, GDP pe r capita, 
and FDI. However, the advantage the country obtains from faster implementatio n process 
is obviou s only in the shor t term . In the lon g term, the leve l o f productivity, GD P pe r 
capita, and FDI with different implementatio n duration converge. Therefore, the duration 
of implementation should be justified based on the priority of the short-term goa l instead 
of the long-term goal. 
Reaction of foreign investors toward R&D consortia implementation 
There is an argument that with high technology spillover, FDI is reduced because 
foreign firm s incu r additiona l costs from preventin g th e technolog y leakag e (Sawada , 
2005). Th e implementatio n o f the R& D consorti a policy  ma y result s i n foreign firm s 
concluding that th e leve l o f technology leakag e i s goin g to increase . Thus , base d o n 
Sawada's argument , FDI may drop if the R& D consortia policy is implemented. In order 
to demonstrat e th e reactio n o f MNE s investment , w e compar e th e effec t fro m 
implementing the R& D consorti a policy with and without any negative reactio n and the 
case in which the R&D consortia policy is not implemented at all. For the simulation with 
the negative reaction, we examine 2 scenarios - "Weak " and "Strong". The "Weak" case 
is th e case in which the negativ e effec t reduce s the volum e of FDI b y 5%, and for the 
"Strong" case the volume of FDI i s reduced by 10% when the R& D consorti a policy is 
implemented. 
In the case of weak negative reaction, we assume that MNEs have concluded that 
the Intellectua l Propert y Right s violatio n an d th e technolog y leakag e ar e minimal . 
However, the strong case is based on the opposite assumption of the MNEs ' conclusion. 
138 
In this case, the FD I is reduced from a strong expectation o f technology leakage du e to 
the lack of the Intellectual Property Rights enforcement . 
From th e result , th e negativ e reactio n o f MNE s from  implementin g th e R&D 
consortia polic y doe s not creat e a  differenc e i n the effec t o f implementing the R&D 
consortia policy on country productivity and GDP per capita as shown in Figure 43 and 
Figure 44 even though the FDI volume is different a s presented in Figure 45. 
Country Productivity 
Figure 43: Effect of the negative reaction from MNEs on the country's productivity when 
implementing the R&D consortia policy 
The result o f the negative reaction from foreign firms on FDI is not unexpected . 
The stron g negativ e reactio n pull s dow n the FD I volume an d th e volum e o f FDI is 
highest i f the negative reaction is not considered as shown in Figure 45. However, even 
though th e volum e of FDI i s reduced b y 10 % ("Strong" case ) when implementing the 
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R&D consorti a policy , Thailand stil l gain s significan t benefit s fro m havin g mor e FDI 
inflows in the long term. 
GDP per Capit a 
Figure 44:  Effect of  the  negative  reaction  from MNEs on  the  GDP  per capita  when 
implementing the R&D consortia policy 
Even though the negative reaction from foreign firms reduces the inflo w of FDI, 
the productivity and GDP per capita receive no effect fro m it because of the fixed capital 
as presente d i n Figure 46 . Th e amoun t o f fixed  capita l i n Thailan d doe s not chang e 
significantly even though a difference i n FDI is significant because the new fixed capital 
investment is small compared to the existing stock of fixed capital. 
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FDI 
Figure 45: Effect of the negative reaction from MNEs on the FDI when implementing the 
R&D consortia policy 
Fixed Capital 
Figure 46: Comparison  of  the fixed capital  of Thailand when implemented  the R&D 
consortia policy with different negative reaction from MNEs 
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In summary , th e negativ e reactio n fro m foreig n firm s whe n implementin g th e 
R&D consorti a policy reduces the benefits tha t the country gains from implementing the 
R&D consortia policy. However, the drop in the FDI value is not significant compared to 
the tota l amoun t o f FDI inflow . Eve n thoug h th e FD I slightly dropped, th e effec t o n 
country productivity and GD P per capit a is nearly eliminated because it is absorbed by 
the fixed capital . Therefore, the consequence o f the negative reaction on the benefits that 
the country obtains from implementing the R&D consortia policy is insignificant. 
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CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION 
This paper studies the effect o f the R&D consortia policy on productivity growth 
from technology spillover through foreign direct investment in the Southeast Asia region 
under the dynamic and system approach. This study opens a new perspective in the fiel d 
of technology spillover from FD I for several reasons. First , the majority of the research 
on technology spillover focuses on the static view which can only observe the situation as 
a snap-sho t picture . The problem of the snap-sho t approac h i s that i t is impossible to 
understand th e developmen t and evolution of the situatio n over time. In this paper we 
utilize the dynamic s approach which provides the change o f the situatio n at every step 
within the study period. Second, most of the literature in the field utilizes the linear open-
loop approac h whic h studie s onl y th e effec t o f FDI on technology spillove r withou t 
considering th e feedbac k effec t o f technology spillove r o n th e FDI . This open-loo p 
approach becomes a  major weakness in many papers because the recommendations may 
provide the opposite results when considering the whole cause and effect loop . Last but 
not least, this paper analyzes the effect o f the R&D consortia policy in the Southeast Asi a 
region which , base d o n m y knowledge , has no t bee n conducte d before . On e reaso n 
behind the lack of research on the R& D consorti a policy in the Southeast Asi a region is 
that such a policy has not been implemented in this region before and thus it is impossible 
to conduct an empirical research on this topic. However, this paper applie s the system 
dynamics method which studies a situation from the simulation developed from the cause 
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and effect relationship . The system dynamics approach allows us to analyze the possible 
outcomes fro m the implementatio n of the policie s that have bee n utilize d i n differen t 
environment even though they have not been applied in these specific environments. 
The study starts from developing a foundation model structure of the productivity 
growth from technology spillove r through FDI using the caus e and effect relationship . 
The developed model has been tested for correctness, accuracy , and robustness b y using 
the dimensio n consistency method , th e behavio r reproduction test, the famil y membe r 
method, th e surpris e behavio r method , an d th e mode l forecastabilit y method . Th e 
foundation structure the n is applied to the situation of Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
as representative countrie s in the Southeas t Asi a region. The coefficients to be input in 
the model are acquired from the empirical data of Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The 
simulation result s fro m th e model s fo r Thailand , Malaysia , an d Vietna m ar e als o 
compared to the empirical data to validate the results of the model as well as to check the 
accuracy of the model. These models are used as the foundation to analyze the effect of 
the R&D consortia policy on productivity growth from technology spillover through FDI 
in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The model is also applied to the situation in Japan in 
order to study the behavior of the system of a country in which the R&D consortia policy 
has already been implemented and also to capture the effect o f the R&D consortia policy 
on each variable in the system. After obtaining the coefficients of the effect o f the R& D 
consortia polic y o n productivit y growt h from  technolog y spillove r i n Japan , thes e 
coefficients ar e implemente d int o the model s fo r Thailand , Malaysia, an d Vietna m to 
represent what would happen i f these three countries utilize the R& D consorti a policy. 
The results ar e compare d to the normal situation in which the R& D consorti a policy is 
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not implemente d i n orde r t o understan d th e effec t o f th e R& D consortia polic y o n 
productivity growth from technology spillove r through FD I in Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam. The similarity of the results o f these three countries is summarized as the effec t 
of the R& D consorti a policy on productivity growth from technology spillove r through 
FDI in the Southeast Asia region. 
The simulation results fo r Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Japan show that the 
model ca n significantl y trace the chang e o f the variable s tha t affec t th e productivity 
growth from technology spillove r through FD I which consists o f the productivity of the 
country, the productivity of foreign country which is selected from the countr y that has 
the highest inward FDI share, gross domestic product, GDP per capita, FDI, fixed capital, 
employment, and population. After implementing the coefficient of the effect o f the R&D 
consortia policy on productivity growth from technology spillover through FDI which is 
obtained from Japan's model into the model s for Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam, the 
results sho w that all three countries have a  significant growth in the productivity of the 
country. Therefore , i t i s prove d tha t th e R& D consortia polic y ca n improv e th e 
productivity growt h fro m technolog y spillove r throug h FD I i n th e countrie s i n th e 
Southeast Asia region. 
There i s a debate that higher technology spillove r will bloc k the growt h of FDI 
because foreign investors consider the chance of losing their technology knowledge as an 
extra cost of operations (Sawada, 2005). This is reasonable i f we consider only a one-way 
relationship which is the effec t o f technology spillove r on FDI. However , the result s in 
this paper show the opposite consequence o f higher technology spillover. The technology 
spillover increases the productivity of the host country which in turn supports the growth 
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of the people's income . With higher incomes, the host country becomes more attractive 
for foreign investment as an expanding market opportunity. When compensating the new 
market opportunit y with an increase in cost to prevent the technology spillover , foreign 
firms stil l gain benefits from investing in these countries. Therefore, technology spillover 
increases the FDI through market expansion . As FDI grows, the host countries also get 
benefits fro m highe r technolog y spillove r as wel l a s mor e employmen t an d capita l 
investment which create feedbacks to increase the productivity of the country. This works 
as a closed-loop reinforcing system that drives the economy of host countries up in both 
the short term and the long term. 
The benefit s tha t the countr y receive s fro m implementin g the R& D consorti a 
policy varies based o n the economi c situation and the risk of the country . The country 
with mature economy gains higher productivity growth but receive less additiona l FDI 
from th e R& D consorti a policy while the countr y with rapidly growing economy gains 
less productivit y growth but receiv e highe r inflo w FDI . Th e country wit h highe r risk 
requires a  longe r tim e fo r th e effec t o f the R& D consorti a policy  o n FDI to happe n 
because foreign investors take longer time to make an investment decision. 
The R&D consortia policy implementation process is also affected to the result of 
the policy . W e focu s o n th e effec t o f polic y implementatio n duratio n an d negativ e 
reaction from foreign firms concluding that the technology leakage wil l increase. Having 
a fast implementation process provides more benefits to the country than prolonging the 
process. However, the difference i n benefits fro m shortening the implementation time is 
significant onl y in the shor t term . I n th e lon g term, th e benefit s ga p from  differen t 
implementation time is reduced. 
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The negative reaction from foreign firms reduces the value of FDI. However , the 
effect o f having low FDI is diminishe d by the fixe d capita l because the reductio n in 
additional fixe d capita l investmen t i s no t significan t compare d t o th e stoc k o f fixe d 
capital. Therefore, th e consequence o f the negative reactio n on the countr y productivity 
and GDP pe r capita is small. 
The polic y implicatio n from thi s researc h i s clea r that the government s o f the 
countries i n th e Southeas t Asi a regio n shoul d implemen t th e R& D consortia polic y 
because it wil l improv e the productivity growth of the countr y as wel l a s the wealth of 
people in that country and FDI. However , the results do not suggest that the governmen t 
should implement the policy at al l cost . The key factor that drives up all the improvement 
from th e R& D consorti a policy i s the productivit y growth. The R& D consorti a policy 
will increase productivity, average population income, and FDI i n both the short term and 
the long term only if the R& D consorti a policy pushes the productivity up from the start. 
Therefore, i f the polic y implementatio n proces s involve s a significan t reduction in the 
productivity of the firms , the R& D consorti a policy should be re-analyzed. However, i f 
the implementatio n process o f the R& D consorti a policy consist s o f having lower FDI, 
the R& D consorti a should stil l be implemented because the highe r productivity growth 
from th e R& D consorti a policy wil l driv e up the countr y GD P per capit a which then 
attracts more FDI . 
Every research ha s limitations , including this dissertation. On e of the limitations 
is tha t there are som e countr y factor s tha t may affec t th e decisio n making of foreign 
investment. Thes e factor s includ e the economi c an d politica l situatio n o f the country , 
exchange rate , interest rate , the degre e of government intervention , and corruption and 
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transparency level . The results may also differ according to the industrial characteristics. 
Besides, this study is conveyed on the macro leve l and thus the results ar e the average 
results o f every firm i n every industry. The results o n each fir m i n a different industr y 
may vary and would need the firm-leve l an d industry-level analysis if the detai l results 
are required . Usin g Japa n a s th e onl y country t o represen t a  countr y with  th e R&D 
consortia policy i s also another limitation of this paper. Some country-specific factor s 
may have an influence on the effect o f the R&D consortia policy on technology spillover. 
By comparing and contrasting several different countrie s which already implemented the 
R&D consorti a policy  woul d eliminat e th e effec t o f thes e country-specifi c factors . 
Another interestin g issu e t o b e stud y i s th e effec t o f dela y perio d betwee n polic y 
implementation and the result. Because it takes significant time for FDI to grow from the 
R&D consorti a policy, i t may raise a  question among the implementer s i f the polic y is 
effective especially if the negative reaction from foreign firms is strong. The government 
that concentrates on short-term resul t may pull ou t the R& D consorti a implementation 
process whic h may create an unexpected result . Therefore, the goa l and behavior of the 
government is interesting to be considered. 
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